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Introduction 
This Article deals with student loans from repayment to collection. 
Our technical descriptions, beginning with the types of loans and ending 
with bankruptcy, are crucial to understanding both the system and our 
policy evaluations in the conclusion. We seek to foster a dialogue 
culminating in a simpler and fairer system. 
Student loans represent a large and growing share of consumer debt. In 
just the last ten years, aggregate student loan balances have quadrupled1 due 
to growth in both college enrollment and tuition.2 Outstanding student loan 
                                                                                                     
 1. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit, 
(Nov. 2013), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/householdcredit/2013-Q3/HH 
DC_2013Q3.pdf. 
 2. Meta Brown et al., Grading Student Loans, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. (Mar. 5, 
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balances now exceed outstanding credit card or auto loan balances.3 
Americans today owe more than $1 trillion in student loans either held or 
guaranteed by the federal government and about $165 billion in private 
student loans.4 
Student debt has serious consequences for borrowers struggling to 
make ends meet. A recent study found that 40% of students delayed a major 
purchase, such as a home or car, because of student loan debt, and more 
than a quarter moved in with parents or family members to save money.5 A 
similar proportion dropped out of school or put off continuing their 
education.6 One borrower interviewed by the New York Times was 
working three jobs to pay off the $70,000 of student loan debt she incurred 
before dropping out of college.7 
Seventy-one percent of graduates from four-year programs had student 
loans, with wide variations. Data on private loans are limited; parental 
borrowing isn’t included. Undergraduate debt averages $29,400.8 Abuses 
occur in the for-profit sector where 88% of students borrowed with an 
average debt $39,950.9 The DOE attempts to reduce abuses with what it 
calls the “Gainful Employment” test that controls college programs access 
to federal student aid.10 Student debts for professional schools like medicine 
                                                                                                     
2012), http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2012/03/grading-student-loans.html. 
 3. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 1 (discussing the types of debt held 
by Americans). 
 4. Rohit Chopra, Student Loan Debt Swells, Federal Loans Now Top a Trillion, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (July 17, 2013), http://www.Consumer 
finance.gov/newsroom/student-debt-swells-federal-loans-now-top-a-trillion/; U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., Federal Student Aid Portfolio Summary, http://studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default 
/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/PortfolioSummary.xls [hereinafter Federal Student Aid 
Portfolio Summary] (last visited Feb. 12, 2014). 
 5. Charley Stone, Carl Van Horn & Cliff Zukin, Chasing the American Dream: 
Recent College Graduates and the Great Recession, RUTGERS SCH. PLANNING & PUB. POL’Y 
at 13 (May 2012), available at http://media.philly.com/documents/20120510_Chasing 
_American_Dream.pdf. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Andrew Martin & Andrew W. Lehren, A Generation Hobbled by the Soaring 
Cost of College, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 
05/13/business/student-loans-weighing-down-a-generation-with-heavy-debt.html?page 
wanted=all&_r=0 (discussing the rising debt many students take on to afford college). 
 8. Beckie Supiano, Borrowers’ Average Debt at Graduation Climbs to $29,400, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 4, 2013). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Kelly Field, More Programs Would Fall Under New ‘Gainful Employment’ 
Proposal, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 12, 2013). 
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and law as well as graduate degrees reach in the $100,000 to $200,000 
range, some more.11 Of the major types of household debt, the rate of 
delinquent payments is highest among student loans, at 11.5 percent.12 
This Article will give these borrowers and their attorneys a better 
understanding of student loan debt. Part I briefly describes the types of 
student loans that borrowers might have. Part II considers repayment of 
student loans; it outlines a student’s options for avoiding default. Part III 
discusses how student loans fall into default and what happens once they 
get there; it includes the government’s administrative techniques to collect a 
defaulted student loan. Part IV describes the borrower’s two primary 
options for getting out of default: consolidation and rehabilitation. Part IV 
addresses discharge of student loan debt, discussing both statutory 
discharge and discharge in bankruptcy. 
A student loan resembles a labyrinth; it’s easy for you to enter, but 
once you get into trouble, it is difficult, maybe impossible, to exit. We turn 
to the entrance—what forms may a student loan take? 
I. Types of Student Loans 
There are two types of student loans: first, “federal” student loans, 
which are issued pursuant to a federal program and governed by a 
substantial body of federal law; and second, “private” student loans, which 
are issued by states, financial institutions, and schools, and are, for most 
purposes, governed only by generally applicable laws regulating financial 
credit products. 
A. Federal Student Loans  
Federal student loans are issued under three programs: the Federal 
Direct Loan Program,13 the Federal Perkins Loan Program,14 and Federal 
                                                                                                     
 11. Audrey Williams June, The Cost of a Ph.D.: Students Report Hefty Debt Across 
Many Fields, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 16, 2014). 
 12. Danielle Douglas, Household Debt Grows, but Americans Seem More Cautious, 
WASH. POST (February 19, 2014), at A8. 
 13. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087a–1087j (2012). The Direct Loan statute borrows many 
provisions from sections governing FFEL loans. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1078-2(a)(2) 
(providing that Direct loans “have the same terms, conditions, and benefits as loans made to 
borrowers under” the FFEL program, unless otherwise specified in the sections governing 
Direct loans). 
COLLECTION OF STUDENT LOANS 219 
Family Education Loan (FFEL) Program.15 Direct and FFEL loans can be 
further classified into two types of loans: Stafford and PLUS loans. Stafford 
loans provide more favorable terms to borrowers and are made regardless 
of credit history, but are subject to annual and aggregate limits that fall 
short of what many students need.16 Some Stafford loans are subsidized—
which means that the loan principal accrues no interest while the student 
borrower is attending school. Subsidized Stafford loans are available only 
to students who demonstrate financial need.17 As of July 2012, they are not 
available to graduate students. Stafford loans are by far the most prevalent 
student loan product, typically comprising between 60 and 80 percent of 
annual student lending (including private loans).18 
PLUS loans carry a higher interest rate.19 They are available only to 
graduate students or parents of undergraduates.20 Eligibility for PLUS loans 
depends on credit history. PLUS loans account for roughly fifteen cents of 
every dollar in student loans taken out in the last three years.21 
Under the Direct Loan Program, the federal government lends money 
directly to students attending qualifying institutions of higher education. 
Typically, either the school of attendance or an “alternative originator” will 
originate the loan,22 and the Department of Education will contract with 
third parties to service loans.23 Interest rates for direct loans issued before 
July 1, 2006 are variable, subject to a cap of 8.25% or 9%, depending on 
the type of loan.24 Interest rates for loans issued since July 1, 2006 are fixed 
at 6.8% for most Stafford loans and 7.9% for PLUS loans.25 Interest accrues 
                                                                                                     
 14. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1071–1087-4 (2012). 
 15. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087aa–ii (2012). 
 16. See 20 U.S.C. § 1078-8(d) (2012) (detailing annual and aggregate limits for 
student borrowers); see also 34 C.F.R. § 685.203. 
 17. See 20 U.S.C. § 1078(a)(2) (2012) (requiring borrowers to submit a statement 
setting forth the loan amount for which the student shows financial need). 
 18. COLLEGE BD., Trends in Student Aid 2013, TRENDS IN HIGHER EDUC. at 17, 
https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/student-aid-2013-full-report. pdf, (2013) 
[hereinafter COLLEGE BD.]. 
 19. See COLLEGE BD., supra note 18, at 9 (analyzing the terms of PLUS loans). 
 20. See COLLEGE BD., supra note 18, at 9.  
 21. See COLLEGE BD., supra note 18, at 9-12. 
 22. 20 U.S.C. § 1087b(a) (2012). 
 23. 20 U.S.C. § 1087f (2012). 
 24. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(1)–(6) (2012). 
 25. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(7) (2012). Undergraduate Stafford loans issued between July 
1, 2006 and July 1, 2013 are subject to reduced rates. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(7)(D) (2012). 
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only on the unpaid principal balance.26 Origination fees for loans issued 
since 2010 are fixed at 1% of principal amount for Stafford loans and 4% of 
principal amount for PLUS and consolidation loans.27 As of the second 
quarter of 2013, some 24.1 million borrowers owed roughly $553.0 billion 
on Direct loans.28 
Students with demonstrated financial need are eligible for Perkins 
loans.29 Perkins loans are the most affordable federal student loan product, 
with interest rates currently fixed at five percent.30 Like some Stafford 
loans, they do not incur interest while the student is in school.31 Under the 
Perkins program, eligible schools establish a student loan fund, which the 
federal government helps support through capital contributions.32 Schools 
issue loans to eligible students from the fund and are responsible for 
collecting principal and interest from borrowers.33 The Perkins program is 
very limited in scope, accounting for less than 1% of student loan 
disbursements in recent years.34  Outstanding Perkins loan balances total to 
just $8.3 billion.35 
Under the FFEL program, private financial institutions loaned to 
students. These loans are insured by guaranty agencies—nonprofit or 
government entities that bear most of the responsibility for administering 
the FFEL program—which are reinsured by the Department of Education.36 
                                                                                                     
 26. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(8) (2012). 
 27. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(c) (2012). 
 28. Federal Student Aid Portfolio Summary, supra note 4. 
 29. 20 U.S.C. § 1087dd(b)(1) (2012); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087kk–vv (2012).  
 30. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087dd(c)(1)(D) (fixing the interest at five percent for loans made 
after Oct. 1, 1981); see also 34 C.F.R. § 674.31(b)(1)(i) (2012) (requiring that the 
promissory note state the rate of interest of the loan be five percent). 
 31. 20 U.S.C. § 1087dd(c)(1)(D) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 674.31(b)(1)(ii) (2012). 
 32. 20 U.S.C. § 1087cc(a)(2) (2012). 
 33. Id. 
 34. COLLEGE BD., supra note 18, at 10, 17. 
 35. Federal Student Aid Portfolio Summary, supra note 4. 
 36. Guaranty agencies typically served student-borrowers in a particular state or group 
of states. The guaranty agency for Virginia is the Educational Credit Management 
Corporation, a nonprofit corporation organized under the law of Minnesota. Some guaranty 
agencies are arms of state government, a fact that may have several consequences. First, the 
state action doctrine is more likely to apply, so that agency action must comply with the 
federal (and perhaps also the state) constitution. Additionally, if the agency acts “under color 
of state law,” a plaintiff suing the agency for a violation of federal law may have a claim 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provided that the agency is a “person” within the meaning of 
§ 1983. Second, the doctrine of sovereign immunity may bar offensive suits for damages 
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Since Congress has abolished the FFEL program, the federal government 
now issues all Stafford and PLUS loans.37 FFEL regulations remain 
important, however, as 21.6 million borrowers still owe $437.0 billion on 
FFEL loans issued before 2010.38 
B. Private Student Loans 
Private student loans are not issued pursuant to a federal program. 
These loans may come from a variety of sources, including financial 
institutions, nonprofit organizations, states, and even schools themselves. 
Private student loans typically carry higher interest rates than federal loans 
and may also subject buyers to prepayment penalties.39 For the most part, 
the law treats these loans as any other credit product, with one key 
exception, which we turn to below: like federal student loans, many private 
student loans are exempted from discharge from bankruptcy.40 
The rate of private student lending has varied substantially over the 
past decade. In the early and mid 2000s, private student loans grew quickly. 
In just four years, the share of undergraduate students taking out private 
student loans tripled.41 By the 2006–07 and 2007–08 academic years, 
private student loans accounted for 25% of total student lending.42 Private 
student lending fell sharply during the recession, and despite increases in 
the most recent academic year, it remains at less than 40% of peak levels.43 
In the 2012–13 academic year, these lenders issued roughly $8.8 billion in 
student loans.44 
The common understanding is that once a borrower owes a creditor 
money, she repays the loan. That is our next subject.  
                                                                                                     
against the agency. Third, judicial review of agency action may be available in state court. 
 37. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 
§ 2201, 124 Stat. 1029, 1074–75 (2010). 
 38. Federal Student Aid Portfolio Summary, supra note 4. 
 39. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Your Federal Student Loans: Learn the Basics and Manage 
Your Debt, FED. STUDENT AID at 8–9 (2010), available at https://student 
aid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/your-federal-student-loans_1.pdf. 
 40. See infra Part V-B (discussing student loans in bankruptcy). 
 41. Private Loans: Facts and Trends, PROJECT ON STUDENT DEBT (July 2011), 
http://projectonstudentdebt.org/files/pub/private_loan_facts_trends.pdf. 
 42. COLLEGE BD., supra note 18, at 10. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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II. Staying out of Default: Student Loan Repayment 
Because student loan default carries the serious consequences we 
develop below,45 a borrower’s wisest course of action is not to default in the 
first place. Fortunately, statutes and regulations offer borrowers an array of 
tools to avoid defaulting on federal student loans. A borrower may postpone 
payments on student loans through deferments or forbearances. She may 
structure repayment of the loan according to a range of payment schedules, 
some of which set payments based on her income. Her loans may be 
forgiven after twenty-five years of payments under an income-dependent 
plan.46 Finally, a borrower may obtain repayment assistance or cancellation 
based on service in a public-interest profession. 
Most of the statutory repayment options and default-avoidance 
strategies discussed in this Subparts A, B, and C are available only for 
FFEL and Direct loans. A Perkins borrower may pursue a different set of 
statutory default-avoidance options, which we discuss separately in Subpart 
D. Furthermore, all federal student loan borrowers may obtain relief from 
full repayment through statutory cancellation and forgiveness discussed in 
Part V. Borrowers of private student loans generally do not have access to 
these tools, with the exception of certain Loan Repayment Assistance 
Programs. Finally, one method of postponing repayment obligations applies 
to all student loans: filing for bankruptcy.47 
A. Postponing repayment: deferment and forbearance 
A borrower enjoys a grace period of six months before her first 
payment is due after ceasing enrollment in school on at least a half-time 
basis for Direct Stafford loans.48 The repayment period for Direct PLUS 
                                                                                                     
 45. See infra Part III (discussing student loans in delinquency and default). 
 46. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Income-Based Plan, Fed. Student Aid, available at 
http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/plans/income-based (setting forth advan-
tages of the Income-Based Repayment Plan (IBR), including the twenty-five year 
forgiveness advantage whereby one may be forgiven of their remaining loan balance after 
twenty-five years of qualifying repayment). 
 47. See infra Part V-B (discussing student loans in bankruptcy). 
 48. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.207(b)(1)(ii), (c)(1)(ii) (2009); see also 34 C.F.R. 
§ 682.209(a)(2)–(5) (2013) (regulations for FFEL grace periods).  
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loans begins the day the loan is fully disbursed,49 but a borrower who is in 
school may obtain an in-school deferment.50 
Once a federal student loan enters repayment status, a borrower may 
postpone repayment by obtaining either a deferment or forbearance. This 
section begins with deferments, which are typically more favorable to 
borrowers before moving to forbearance. 
A borrower not in default51 may be eligible for one of a number of 
deferments of payments on her FFEL and Direct Loans.52 During a 
deferment period, “periodic installments of principal and interest need not 
be paid.”53 In general, a borrower does not automatically receive 
deferments, but instead must request them from her lender.54 Interest 
accrues on unsubsidized FFEL and Direct loans.55 Moreover, the lender 
may capitalize—that is, add accrued interest (as well as unpaid insurance 
premiums for FFEL loans) to the unpaid principal balance.56 A borrower 
may avoid capitalization by paying the interest that accrues during the 
period of deferment.57 
The grounds for deferment are many. The two most important grounds 
for deferment are enrollment in school58 and economic hardship.59 Others 
                                                                                                     
 49. 34 C.F.R. § 685.207(d) (2009). 
 50. 34 C.F.R. § 685.204(b)(1) (2009). 
 51. Borrowers in default must have made repayment arrangements satis-factory to the 
holder of the loan to be eligible for a deferment. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.204(h) (Direct), 
682.210(a)(8) (FFEL). 
 52. Id. 
 53. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.204(a)(1) (Direct), 682.210(a)(1) (FFEL). 
 54. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.204(i)(1) (Direct), 682.210(d)(1) (FFEL graduate 
fellowship deferment), (f)(1) (FFEL temporary total disability deferment), (o)(1) (FFEL 
parental leave deferment). For most types of deferments, borrowers must provide supporting 
documentation as well. Cf. 34 C.F.R. § 685.204(i)(2) (listing deferments which may be 
granted for Direct Loans on verbal application alone). In-school deferments may be 
processed without application from the borrower. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.204(i)(1), 
682.210(c)(1)(ii)–(iv) (FFEL). Additionally, a lender may grant a military service deferment 
upon application from a borrower’s representative. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.204(i)(1), 
682.210(t)(7). 
 55. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.204(a)(2) (Direct), 682.210(a)(3)(i)(B) (FFEL). 
 56. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.202(b) (Direct), 682.202(b) (FFEL). If a loan is subsidized, 
capitalization is not a concern during deferments because the interest owed by the borrower 
does not accrue during the deferment period. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.204(a)(1) (Direct), 
682.210(a)(3)(i)(A) (FFEL). 
 57. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.204(a)(2), 682.210(a)(3)(ii). 
 58. 34 C.F.R. § 685.204(b)(1)(i)(A) (Direct) (generally, enrollment in school means at 
least one-half the normal full-time work load for the course of study that the borrower is 
 
224 20 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 215 (2014) 
include active duty military service,60 pregnancy or parental leave,61 
unemployment,62 disability of the borrower or a spouse or dependent,63 and 
enrollment in a medical internship or residency program.64 Deferments may 
also be available to borrowers engaged in certain public interest work.65 Not 
all grounds for deferment apply to all loans; some are limited to loans 
extended during a particular period, and some deferments are only available 
for a limited period of time.66 
A borrower struggling to repay loans may also qualify for forbearance, 
which is “the temporary cessation of payments, allowing an extension of 
time for making payments, or temporarily accepting smaller payments than 
previously were scheduled.”67 The purpose of forbearance is “to prevent the 
borrower or endorser from defaulting on the borrower's or endorser's 
repayment obligation, or to permit the borrower or endorser to resume 
honoring that obligation after default.”68 
A borrower who qualifies for forbearance generally has the option to 
choose which type of forbearance to accept, though temporary cessation of 
payments is the default option.69 Interest accrues during any period of 
forbearance,70 and, for most FFEL and Direct Loans, is capitalized.71 A 
borrower may avoid capitalization by paying interest that accrues during the 
period of forbearance.72 Certain grounds for forbearance are administrative 
and are granted upon either an oral request from the borrower or no request 
                                                                                                     
pursuing); 34 C.F.R. § 682.210(b)(1)(i), (b)(4), (c), (s)(2) (FFEL) (requiring at least half-
time study for deferment). Different regulations apply to loans first disbursed on or after July 
1, 2008. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.204(g); 682.210(v). 
 59. 34 C.F.R. § 685.204(b)(3), (c); 34 C.F.R. § 682.210(s)(6). 
 60. 34 C.F.R. § 685.204(e), (f); 34 C.F.R. § 682.210(b)(2)(i), (t), (u). 
 61. 34 C.F.R. § 682.210(b)(3)(i), (o). 
 62. 34 C.F.R. § 685.204(b)(2), (c); 34 C.F.R. § 682.210(b)(1)(v), (b)(3)(ii), (h), (s)(5). 
 63. 34 C.F.R. § 682.210(b)(1)(iv), (f), (g). 
 64. 34 C.F.R. § 682.210(b)(2)(v), (b)(5)(iii), (n). 
 65. 34 C.F.R. § 682.210(b)(2)(i)–(iv), (5)(i)–(ii). 
 66. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 685.204(c) (stating a borrower may only receive three years 
of either economic hardship or unemployment deferments). 
 67. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.205(a) (Direct), 682.211(a)(1) (FFEL), 674.33(d)(1) (Perkins). 
 68. 34 C.F.R. § 682.211(a)(1) 
 69. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.205(a), 682.211(g), 674.33(d)(4). 
 70. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.205(a) (Direct), 682.211(e)(2)(iii) (FFEL), 674.33(d)(7) 
(Perkins). 
 71. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.205(a), 682.211(e)(2)(v). 
 72. Id. 
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at all.73 In other cases, the borrower must request forbearance from the 
secretary or lender in writing and, if necessary, provide documentation 
supporting the request.74 Unlike deferments, forbearances may be granted to 
a borrower in default.  
As with deferment, grounds for forbearance differ depending on the 
type of loan. A borrower is entitled to forbearance when her debt burden 
exceeds 20% of her monthly gross income,75 while she participates in a 
medical or dental internship or residency program (provided she is not 
eligible for deferment),76 while she serves in a national service position for 
which she has received an award under the National and Community 
Service Act,77 and while she serves in a teaching position that qualifies for 
teacher loan forgiveness.78 Forbearance will also be granted to borrowers 
during a national emergency, as declared by the Secretary, and to borrowers 
in disaster areas.79 Certain active duty and post-active duty service members 
may also be eligible for mandatory forbearance.80 Finally, if a borrower will 
be unable to repay the loan within the maximum repayment period 
(generally ten years) either because of the effect of variable interest rate on 
a standard or graduated repayment schedule or because of income-sensitive 
repayment plan, forbearance may be granted for a limited period of time, 
either three or five years, depending on the circumstances.81 
In other circumstances, the Secretary will grant forbearance to Direct 
Loan borrowers, while forbearance on FFEL loans is “discretionary.” The 
                                                                                                     
 73. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.205(b) (setting forth circumstances where the Secretary will 
grant forbearance without requiring documentation from the borrower), 682.211(i) 
(mandatory administrative forbearance). 
 74. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.205(a), 682.211(f), (h). 
 75. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.205(a)(6) (Direct), 682.211(h)(2)(i) (FFEL). 
 76. 20 U.S.C. § 1087(c)(3)(A)(i)(I) (FFEL); 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.205(a)(3) (Direct), 
682.211(h)(1) (FFEL). 
 77. 20 U.S.C. § 1087(c)(3)(A)(i)(III) (FFEL); 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.205(a)(4) (Direct), 
682.211(h)(2)(ii)(A) (FFEL). 
 78. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.205(a)(5) (Direct), 682.211(h)(2)(ii)(C) (FFEL). 
 79. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.205(b)(8) (2010) (Direct), 682.211(i)(2)(i)–(ii) (2013) (FFEL); 
see also 34 C.F.R. § 682.211(f)(2) (establishing discretionary FFEL forbearance for up to 60 
days when borrower’s ability to repay has been adversely affected by a disaster or other 
emergency). 
 80. See 20 U.S.C. § 1078(c)(3)(A)(i)(IV) (2011) (stating that an individual may be 
“eligible for interest payments to be made on such loan for service in the Armed Forces . . 
. .”); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.205(a)(7), 682.211(h)(2)(ii)(B), (h)(2)(iii) (establishing 
forbearance for a member of the National Guard). 
 81. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.205(b)(7) (Direct), 682.211(i)(5) (FFEL). 
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Secretary must grant forbearance of direct loans for the period necessary to 
determine the borrower’s eligibility for discharge.82 FFEL lenders may also 
grant forbearance for the period necessary to investigate the borrower’s 
death or total and permanent disability.83 The Secretary must, and a FFEL 
lender may, grant forbearance for up to sixty days to “collect and process 
documentation supporting the borrower's request for a deferment, 
forbearance, change in repayment plan, or consolidation loan.”84 The 
Secretary must, and a FFEL lender may, retroactively grant forbearance 
during a properly granted deferment period for which the Secretary or 
lender later learns that the borrower did not qualify.85 Forbearance is also 
available to borrowers during several transitional periods around events like 
the sale or transfer of a loan or a change in repayment plan.86 Finally, the 
secretary will grant forbearance when the borrower demonstrates inability 
to make payments due to poor health or other acceptable reasons.87 
B. Structuring and extending repayment 
FFEL and Direct Loan borrowers may choose from an extensive menu 
of loan repayment plans: standard, graduated, extended, income-based, 
income-contingent, income-sensitive, and pay-as-you-earn. The first three 
plans—standard, graduated, and extended repayment—set payments solely 
based on outstanding amount of the loan, and are available to all borrowers. 
Payments in the remaining four plans are based, at least in part, on a 
borrower’s income. Not all of these plans are available for all types of 
loans, and most are available only to borrowers who demonstrate some 
degree of financial hardship. 
                                                                                                     
 82. 34 C.F.R. § 685.205(b)(5) (death or total/permanent disability), (b)(6)(i)–(iii) 
(school related), (b)(6)(iv) (teacher loan forgiveness). 
 83. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 682.211(i)(6) (establishing mandatory 60 day administrative 
forbearance to investigate the borrower’s, or the student’s, in case of a parent PLUS loan, 
death), (f)(7) (establishing additional discretionary 60 day forbearance to investigate 
borrower’s death), (f)(5) (governing when an individual has total and permanent disability).  
 84. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.205(b)(9) (Direct); 682.211(f)(11) (FEEL) (stating that interest 
accrued during this period is not capitalized). 
 85. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.205(b)(1), 682.211(f)(1). 
 86. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.205(b)(2)–(4), (10); 682.211(f)(2)–(4), (9), (10), (14), (15) 
(discussing multiple periods of delinquency). 
 87. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.205(a)(1) (“The Secretary determines that, due to poor health 
or other acceptable reasons, the borrower or endorser is currently unable to make scheduled 
payments. . . .”). 
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Under standard and graduated repayment plans, a borrower has 
between five and ten years to repay most Direct and FFEL loans.88 Under a 
standard repayment plan, monthly payments are fixed;89 under the 
graduated plan, monthly payments change (typically by increasing), over 
the term of the loan,90 but the minimum and maximum monthly payments 
differ by no more than a factor of three.91 
The extended repayment plan is an intermediate option between the 
standard and graduated plans and the income-dependent plans. Like the 
income-dependent repayment plans, it extends the maximum repayment 
period, typically to twenty-five years.92 As under standard repayment plans, 
a borrower must make minimum monthly payments of $50.93 Payment 
amounts under extended repayment plans may be either fixed or 
graduated.94 
As their names suggest, the income-sensitive, income-based, income-
contingent, and pay-as-you-earn plans all set payments based on the 
borrower’s income. An income-sensitive repayment (ISR) plan is available 
only for a FFEL loan. The ISR plan differs from income-contingent and 
income-based plans in three significant respects, each of which makes ISR 
substantially less favorable to the FFEL borrower than IBR: first, the 
maximum repayment period is extended by only five years under income-
sensitive plan, as opposed to fifteen for IBR and ICR, second, a borrower 
does not become eligible for forgiveness based on payment under an ISR 
                                                                                                     
 88. The period is set at ten years for Direct loans, 34 C.F.R. § 685.208(b)(1) 
(standard), (g)(1) (2013) (graduated), except that the maximum period is longer and depends 
on the total amount of outstanding student loans for consolidation loans of borrowers who 
entered repayment after July 1, 2006. Id. § 685.208(c)(1) (standard), (h)(1) (graduated), and 
for loans of borrowers who entered repayment before that date and are paying under 
graduated repayment plan. Id. § 685.208(f)(1). For FFEL loans, the lender fixes the term 
between five and ten years, 34 C.F.R. § 682.209(a)(7)(i) (2013), except that the repayment 
period for consolidation loans is between ten and thirty years, depending on the amount of 
outstanding student loans. Id. § 682.209(h). 
 89. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.208(b)(1), (c)(1) (2013), 682.209(a)(6)(vi) (2013). 
 90. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.208(f)(1), (g)(1), (h)(1), 682.209(a)(6)(vii). 
 91. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.208(f)(3), (g)(3), (h)(2), 682.209(a)(6)(ii) (requiring that any 
single installment may not be more than three times greater than any other installment). 
 92. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.208(d)(1), (e)(1), 682.209(a)(6)(ix), (a)(7)(i). 
 93. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 682.209(c)(i) (establishing a “minimum annual payment” on 
FFELs of $600), FFELs are not subject to this minimum if the borrower and lender agree 
otherwise. 34 C.F.R. § 682.209(c)(1)(ii). Graduated repayment plans are generally not 
subject to the $50 minimum. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.208(f)(3), (g)(3), (h)(2), 682.209(a)(6)(ii). 
 94. 34 C.F.R. §§ 682.208(e)(1), 682.209(a)(6)(ix). 
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plan,95 and, third, the borrower must pay at least the accrued interest each 
month.96 As with IBR and ICR, a borrower paying under an ISR plan must 
provide annual-income information to the lender.97 
A direct loan borrower may use an Income Contingent Repayment 
(ICR) plan. ICR plan payments are capped at 20% of the difference 
between the borrower’s adjusted gross income and the relevant federal 
poverty guideline.98 Since this limit is higher than the limit for IBR or pay-
as-you-earn, a borrower who is eligible for either of those plans is probably 
better off opting for one of them over an ICR plan. An ICR plan may still 
be a worthwhile option for some borrowers for two reasons: first, a 
borrower may enter an ICR plan regardless of hardship, and, second, 
eligibility extends to all Direct loans not in default, including consolidation 
loans, regardless of whether the consolidation loan was used to repay a 
parent PLUS loan. As with IBR, accrued interest is capitalized; however, 
capitalization ceases once the outstanding principal amount is ten percent 
greater than the original principal amount.99  
Except for parent PLUS loans and consolidation loans taken out in part 
to repay a parent PLUS loan, all Direct and FFEL loans that are not in 
default are eligible for IBR.100 A borrower must have “partial financial 
hardship” to enter IBR; a borrower who files an individual tax return is 
deemed to have partial financial hardship when her payments under a 
standard repayment plan would exceed payments under IBR.101 A borrower 
must certify her family size to the holder of the loan annually, and, for 
Direct Loans, she must also consent to disclosure of tax return information 
by the IRS to the loan holder.102 
                                                                                                     
 95. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.209(a)(6)(viii)(D), (E) (requiring repayment within 15 years). 
 96. 20 U.S.C. § 1078(b)(9)(A)(iii) (2011); 34 C.F.R. § 682.209(a)(6)(iv). 
 97. 34 C.F.R. § 682.209(a)(6)(viii)(B), (C). 
 98. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(b)(1)(ii)(A)–(B). 
 99. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(b)(3)(iv). 
 100. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.221(a)(2), 682.215(a)(2). 
 101. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.221(a)(4)(i), 682.215(a)(4)(i); see also 34 C.F.R. 
§§ 685.221(a)(4)(ii), 682.215(a)(4)(ii) (establishing requirements for married borrowers 
filing a joint tax return). 
 102. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.221(e)(1), 682.215(e)(1); see also 34 C.F.R. 
§§ 685.221(e)(2), 682.215(d)(1), (e)(7) (stating that borrowers already in IBR who fail to 
provide the required documentation remain in the plan, but their repayments are recalculated 
as if the borrower does not have partial financial hardship). 
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When a borrower who qualifies for IBR enters the plan, monthly 
payments on all eligible loans are limited to one-twelfth of fifteen percent 
of the difference between the borrower’s adjusted gross income and 150% 
of the poverty guideline for the borrower’s family size.103 For new 
borrowers—defined as those who have no outstanding Direct or FFEL 
loans as of July 1, 2014—monthly payments are one-twelfth of ten percent 
of the difference between AGI and 150% of the poverty guideline.104 
Payments are applied to accrued interest, collection costs, late charges, and 
principal, in that order.105 Interest accrues during IBR, except on subsidized 
Stafford loans or the subsidized portion of consolidation loans during the 
first three years of IBR.106 Unpaid interest accrued during IBR is capitalized 
when the borrower leaves the plan or no longer qualifies.107  
If a borrower paying under an IBR plan no longer has partial financial 
hardship or chooses to stop making income-based payments, her monthly 
payment is recalculated to equal what it would have been at the time she 
entered IBR.108 In that case, the borrower remains in the IBR plan; she may 
choose to make the reduced payments if she should encounter further 
hardship; and, in any event, she is not obligated to repay the loan within ten 
years.109 If a borrower leaves the IBR plan, the ten-year maximum 
repayment period applies.110 
In November 2012, the Department of Education rolled out a new 
income-dependent repayment plan for certain Direct loan borrowers—the 
“pay-as-you-earn” plan.111 Pay as you earn is only available to borrowers 
who first received FFEL or Direct loans on October 1, 2007 or later.112 
Additionally, only Direct loans disbursed after October 1, 2011 (or, in the 
                                                                                                     
 103. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.221(b)(1), 682.215(b)(1); 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.221(b)(2)(i), 
682.215(b)(1)(i) (explaining payments are allocated between lenders based on the amount of 
outstanding principal on qualifying loans held); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.221(b)(2)(ii)–(iv), 
682.215(b)(1)(ii)–(iv) (explaining adjustments are also made for certain married filers and 
borrowers whose calculated payment is less than $10.00). 
 104. 34 C.F.R. § 685.221(b)(1). 
 105. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.221(c)(1)(i)–(iv), 682.215(c)(1)(i)–(iv). 
 106. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.221(b)(3), 682.215(b)(4). 
 107. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.221(b)(4), 682.215(b)(5). 
 108. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.221(d)(1)(i), 682.215(d)(1)(i). 
 109. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.221(d)(1)(ii), 682.215(d)(1)(ii). 
 110. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.221(d)(2)(i), 682.215(d)(2). 
 111. 77 Fed. Reg. 66088 (Nov. 1, 2012) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. parts 674, 682, 
685). 
 112. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(1)(iii)(A). 
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case of Direct consolidation loans, applied for after October 1, 2011) are 
eligible for pay as you earn.113  As with IBR, a borrower must demonstrate 
partial financial hardship to repay on a pay-as-you-earn plan.114 For eligible 
borrowers, the pay-as-you-earn plan will usually offer the most favorable 
repayment terms of all income-dependent plans, because it combines the 
best features of IBR and ICR plans. Monthly payments are limited to one-
twelfth of ten percent of the difference between the borrower’s adjusted 
gross income and 150% of the poverty guideline for the borrower’s family 
size—1/3 lower than the current IBR repayment amount.115  Accrued 
interest is capitalized when a borrower leaves the pay-as-you-earn plan or 
no longer has financial hardship, but only up to ten percent of the original 
principal amount.116  Finally, if the monthly payment under pay as you earn 
is insufficient to pay accrued interest, the government will not charge the 
remaining accrued interest for a period of up to three years.117 
One important feature of all income-dependent repayment plans is the 
availability of student loan forgiveness.  To qualify for loan forgiveness, a 
borrower in an income-based or income-contingent repayment plan must 
make either 25 years of monthly payments or the equivalent of 25 years of 
payments through actual payments and economic hardship deferments.118  
Borrowers who choose the pay-as-you-earn plan must make only 20 years 
of payments or the equivalent in payments and economic hardship 
deferments.119  The determination of whether a borrower is entitled to 
forgiveness is made by the guaranty agency for FFEL loans and the 
Secretary for Direct Loans.120 
Loan forgiveness offers the borrower who cannot repay her loans a 
way out of the student loan maze.  But it has one major drawback.  The 
internal revenue code generally treats “income from discharge of 
                                                                                                     
 113. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(1)(iii) (2013). 
 114. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(1)(v), (2)(i) (2013). 
 115. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(2)(i) (2013). 
 116. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(2)(iv) (2013). 
 117. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(2)(iii) (2013). 
 118. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087e(d)(1)(D), 1098e(b)(7) (2010); 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.221(f)(1), 
(f)(2), 682.215(f)(1), (f)(2) (2013). Payments made to rehabilitate a defaulted loan do not 
count toward the twenty-five year period. 34 C.F.R. § 682.215(f)(5). “New” (Post-2014) 
IBR borrowers will have to make only 20 years’ worth of payments or the equivalent. 34 
C.F.R. § 685.221(f)(1) (2013). 
 119. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(6)(ii) (2013). 
 120. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.221(f)(2), 682.215(f)(2) (2013). 
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indebtedness” as taxable income.121  While debt forgiven under public 
service forgiveness and cancellation is excluded from taxable income,122 
debt forgiven after 20 or 25 years of repayments is not. 
C. Public interest repayment assistance and cancellation 
Students who work full time in qualified public-service jobs may be 
entitled to relief from some of their federal student loan debt.  Currently, 
two federal programs may provide a measure of relief from FFEL and 
Direct Loan obligations:  public-service cancellation and teacher-loan 
forgiveness.  Borrowers in public service jobs may also benefit from one of 
many federal, state, and privately-funded Loan Repayment Assistance 
Programs (LRAPs).123 
Public service cancellation is available to a borrower who is not in 
default and has made 120 monthly payments after October 1, 2007 on a 
federal Direct Loan while employed full-time in a public service job.124  An 
eligible borrower is entitled to full discharge of her Direct loan. A borrower 
is employed “Full-time” if she works an average of 30 hours per week over 
the entire year or over the contractual or employment period, if that period 
is of at least eight months.125  Public service jobs include employment with 
a government agency or a section 501(c)(3) nonprofit.126  Excluded from 
                                                                                                     
 121. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(12) (1984). 
 122. 26 U.S.C. § 108(f)(1) (2013). Loan forgiveness and repayment assistance under 
most LRAPs, even if funded by a non-federal or non-governmental actor, is also likely to be 
excluded from taxable income. See Rev. Rul. 2008-34. Philip G. Schrag, Failing Law 
Schools—Brian Tamanaha's Misguided Missile, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 387, 415-16 
(2013) (tax on loans forgiven). 
 123. See Loan Repayment Assistance Programs, EQUAL JUSTICE WORKS 
http://www.equaljusticeworks.org/ed-debt/students/loan-repayment-assistance-programs 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Loan Repayment Assistance Programs]. 
 124. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(1) (2013), (2); 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.212(i) (2010), 
685.219(c) (2012). The borrower must also be employed in a public service profession when 
she submits the application for forgiveness and when the debt is actually discharged. 20 
U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(1)(B)(i) (2010); 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(c)(1)(ii) (2012). 
 125. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(b)(i)(A), (B) (2013). 
 126. The more detailed but redundant list in the statute includes many jobs that are also 
covered under government or nonprofit headings. This list includes employees in emergency 
management; government; military service; public health, safety and education; law 
enforcement; social work in a public child or family service agency; public interest law 
services; early childhood education; public service for individuals with disabilities or the 
elderly; public or school-based library sciences; and other school-based services. 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1087e(3)(B)(i) (2010). Also listed is employment as teaching faculty, either at a Tribal 
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coverage is work for businesses organized for a profit, labor unions, or 
partisan political organizations and work for religious organizations 
involving religious activity or instruction.127  Because cancellation for 
public service is tax-exempt, it is not qualified by the “major drawback” of 
cancellation under income dependent repayment plans discussed above. 
FFEL loans are not eligible for cancellation, and payments made under such 
loans do not count toward the 120-month requirement even if the borrower 
subsequently consolidates her FFEL loans into a Direct Consolidation loan. 
A borrower must apply to receive a public service discharge.128  An 
application should be supported with evidence of public service 
employment during the relevant period.129 
A separate provision allows limited forgiveness of FFEL and Direct 
loans for teachers in disadvantaged schools.  A borrower, not in default, 
who has served as a full-time teacher at a qualifying school for five 
consecutive school years after October 1, 1998 is eligible for limited 
forgiveness of FFEL and Direct loans.130  A borrower meeting teaching 
requirements131 may receive up to $5,000 total in forgiveness for all Direct 
and FFEL loans combined.  That limit is increased to $17,500 if the 
borrower is a highly qualified math or science teacher in a secondary school 
                                                                                                     
College or University or in “high-needs subject area or areas of shortage.” 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1087e(3)(B) (2010). Additionally, Department regulations include service for Peace Corps 
and AmeriCorps. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(c)(ii) (2012). The authors thank Phil Schrag for the 
explanation: The Senate bill included the government plus the long list. The House bill 
included 501(c)(3)s. The conference committee listed all the eligible jobs in both bills, 
which created the redundancy in the statute. 
 127. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(b)(B)(ii) (2012). 
 128. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(e) (2012) (stating that after making 120 qualifying 
payments on eligible loans, a borrower may request loan forgiveness). 
 129. 73 Fed. Reg. 37694, 37705 (July 1, 2008) (insisting that “it is the borrower's 
responsibility to gather and maintain the documents to support his or her eligibility for this 
Federal benefit”). 
 130. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087j(b) (Direct), 1078-10(b) (FFEL) (2009); 34 C.F.R. 
§§ 685.217(c) (Direct), 682.216(c) (FFEL) (2010). The standards for qualifying schools are 
the same as for Perkins discharge. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1087j(b)(1)(A), 1087j(c), 1078-10(b)(1)(A), 
1078-10(c)(2) (2008); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1087ee(a)(2)(A) (2009) (qualifying school for 
Perkins discharge). In particular, the school must be qualified to receive funds under Title I 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 and must be selected by the 
Secretary based on a determination that at least 30% of children enrolled at the school 
qualify for title I services. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.217(c)(1) (Direct), 682.216(a)(2) (FFEL) 
(2008).  
 131. 34 C.F.R. § 685.217(c)(3)(i), (c)(4)(i) (2010); 34 C.F.R. § 682.216(c)(3)(i), 
(c)(4)(i) (2014). 
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or a highly qualified special education teacher in a primary or secondary 
school.132  Interruptions in teaching for military service, FMLA leave, or “a 
return to postsecondary education, on at least a half-time basis” directly 
related to the borrower’s teaching performance do not count as a break in 
the five-year period.133  
A borrower seeking forgiveness must apply on an application form 
provided by the Secretary to the holder of the loan.134  If the Secretary holds 
the loan, he determines the borrower’s eligibility; otherwise, the guaranty 
agency decides.135  No explicit statutory provision authorizes judicial 
review of guaranty agency decisions.  But judicial procedures should be 
available to the borrower to contest the agency’s decision. 
Borrowers who do public interest work after graduation may also 
qualify for Loan Repayment Assistance Programs, or LRAP.  These 
programs are particularly common at law schools.  The sponsor of an 
LRAP provides funds to eligible students to cover a portion of their 
monthly student loan payments.  LRAPs may be sponsored by schools, 
states, government and non-profit employers, and the federal government.  
Unique among the tools discussed in this section, LRAPs may be available 
to help a borrower repay private student loans.  The availability and terms 
of LRAPs change every year.  Some existing LRAPs expire or go 
unfunded, but new LRAPs are also being created.  Borrowers seeking more 
information on LRAPs should consult the website of Equal Justice Works, 
which provides information and links for a range of LRAPs.136 
The Georgetown University Law School has combined its Loan 
Assistance Repayment Program for public service with Grad PLUS loans 
and IBR.137  A GU graduate may work in qualifying employment for ten 
years with the law school’s assistance and secure forgiveness of her loan.138  
                                                                                                     
 132. 34 C.F.R. § 685.217(c)(3)(ii), (c)(4)(ii) (2010); 34 C.F.R. § 682.216(c)(3)(ii), 
(c)(4)(ii) (2014). 
 133. 34 C.F.R. § 685.217(c)(7), (8) (2014); 34 C.F.R. § 682.216(c)(7), (8) (2010). 
 134. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.217(e)(1), (8) (2014); 682.216(f)(1) (2010). 
 135. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.217(e), 682.216(f) (2010). 
 136. See Loan Repayment Assistance Programs, supra note 123.  
 137. Philip G. Schrag & Charles W. Pruett, Coordinating Law School Loan Repayment 
Assistance Programs with New Federal Legislation, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 583, 599 (2011). 
 138. Id. See also Sarah Zearfiss, Joseph Pollak & Lorraine Lamey, A Magic Mirror for 
Student Loans, 3 Journal of Law (2 J. Legal Metrics) 237 (2013) (describing Michigan Law 
School’s debt-management program, its DebtWizard site, the law school’s extended 
repayment program covering graduates’ IBR payments, deferment, and forbearance). 
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Although the conservative New America Foundation attacked GU’s 
program as a “loophole” that is “offering free rides on the taxpayers’ 
dime,”139 GU is reducing burdensome student debt, improving its 
graduates’ employment choices, and channeling legal talent into public 
service.140 
D. Repayment of Perkins loans 
Repayment of a Perkins loan must begin no more than nine months 
after the borrower ceases to be at least a half-time student.  The standard 
repayment period for a Perkins loan is ten years.141  A school may require 
that students make a minimum monthly payment, which is set at $40 for 
Perkins loans made after 1992.142  Repayment of a Perkins loan may be 
extended for up to an additional ten years for a borrower who qualifies as a 
“low-income individual” as defined in statute and regulation.143  Interest 
accrues during any extension.144  A school may also institute incentive 
repayment programs to reward consecutive payments or early repayment.145 
1. Perkins loan deferments and forbearance 
Perkins loan deferment differs from FFEL and Direct loan deferment.  
Interest does not accrue during a Perkins deferment.146 Additionally, a 
borrower in default may obtain a deferment upon entering into a written 
repayment agreement.147  Deferment is available to students enrolled at 
eligible schools, in a graduate or post-graduate fellowship program, or in a 
                                                                                                     
 139. Jason Delisle & Alex Holt, How Elite Law Schools are Offering Free rides on the 
Taxpayers’ Dime, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 13, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/How-
Elite-Law-Schools-Are/141103/. See also Luize Zubrow, Is Loan Forgiveness Divine: 
Another View, 59 GEO. WASH. L.REV. 451 (1991) (expressing skepticism about law-school’s 
loan- forgiveness program). 
 140. William Treanor, Georgetown Law’s Loan Policy is Good for Society as Well as 
Students, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 20, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/Georgetown-
Laws-Loan-Policy/141215/. 
 141. 20 U.S.C. § 1087dd(c)(1)(A) (2010). 
 142. 20 U.S.C. § 1087dd(c)(1)(C) (2010); 34 C.F.R. § 674.33(b) (2010). 
 143. 20 U.S.C. § 1087dd(c)(3)(B) (2010); 34 C.F.R. § 674.33(c) (2010). 
 144. 34 C.F.R. § 674.33(c)(3) (2009). 
 145. 34 C.F.R. § 674.33(f)(1) (2009). 
 146. See 34 C.F.R. § 674.34 (b)–(e), (h), (i), (k) (2008). 
 147. 34 C.F.R. § 674.38(b) (2007). 
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rehabilitation program.148 Deferment is also available if the borrower is 
seeking but unable to find full-time employment,149 is undergoing economic 
hardship,150 or is engaged in active duty military or National Guard 
service.151  Finally, a borrower is entitled to deferment while working in 
Perkins cancellation-eligible occupations.152 
A borrower applying for a Perkins deferment must apply to the school 
holding the loan.153  Regulations do not provide for administrative review 
by the Department. 
Perkins loan forbearance is available if the borrower’s monthly student 
loan obligation exceeds 20% of her monthly gross income, the Secretary 
authorizes a period of forbearance due to a national emergency or military 
mobilization, or the school that made the loan “determines that the 
borrower should qualify for forbearance due to poor health or for other 
acceptable reasons.”154  A borrower seeking forbearance based on income 
levels must provide evidence of both debt burden and monthly income.155  
The school and the borrower must agree to the terms of the forbearance in 
writing.156  Forbearances must be renewed after no more than twelve 
months, and Perkins loans may not be forborne for more than three years.157 
2. Perkins Cancellation 
A borrower employed full-time in certain public service professions is 
eligible for accelerated cancellation of Perkins loans.  The following 
borrowers may be eligible for Perkins discharge:  certain teachers and 
                                                                                                     
 148. 34 C.F.R. § 674.34 (b)(1) (2008). Deferment is not permitted under this provision 
for medical internship or residency programs. 34 C.F.R. § 674.34 (b)(2) (2008). 
 149. 34 C.F.R. § 674.34(d) (2008). 
 150. 34 C.F.R. § 674.34(e) (2008). A borrower qualifies for economic hardship 
deferment of Perkins Loans by showing that she has been granted an economic hardship 
deferment for a Direct or FFEL Loan, is receiving welfare, is a volunteer in the peace corps, 
or qualifies based on monthly gross income or monthly gross income less student loan 
payments. 34 C.F.R. § 674.34(e)(1)–(5) (2008). 
 151. 34 C.F.R. § 674.34(h) (2008). Military borrowers may also qualify for post-active 
duty service deferment under 34 C.F.R. § 674.34(i). 
 152. 34 C.F.R. § 674.34(c) (2008). 
 153. 34 C.F.R. § 674.38(a) (2007). 
 154. 20 U.S.C. § 1087dd(e)(1) (2009); 34 C.F.R. § 674.33(d)(5)(ii) (2009). 
 155. 34 C.F.R. § 674.33(d)(6) (2009). 
 156. 20 U.S.C. § 1087dd(e)(2) (2009); 34 C.F.R. § 674.33(d)(3) (2009). 
 157. 20 U.S.C. § 1087dd(e)(1) (2009); 34 C.F.R. § 674.33(d)(2) (2009). 
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education professionals; members of the Armed Forces serving in a combat 
zone; volunteers under the Peace Corps Act or Domestic Service Act; 
public-sector firefighters and law enforcement or corrections officers; 
attorneys in public defender organizations; nurses or medical technicians; 
and child or family service workers employed by public or private nonprofit 
agencies who provide services to high-risk children in low-income 
communities.158   
A borrower in default may qualify, as long as her loan has not been 
accelerated.159  With a few exceptions, a borrower who qualifies is entitled 
to discharge of 15% of the original principal loan amount in each of the first 
two years of service, 20% in each of the third and fourth years, and 30% in 
the fifth year.160  The borrower is also entitled to discharge of interest 
accrued on the loan during the qualifying year.161 
A borrower seeking a Perkins discharge must submit a request for 
cancellation along with any necessary documentation to the school that 
issued it by the deadline that the school establishes.162  A Perkins loan in 
default may be discharged if it has not been accelerated.  A loan in default 
that has also been accelerated may be discharged for services performed 
                                                                                                     
 158. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087ee(a)(2)(A) (2009) (teachers in qualified low-income schools or 
educational service agencies), 1087ee(a)(2)(B) (preschool teachers in Head Start or similar 
state-sponsored preschools), 1087ee(a)(2)(C) (special education teachers and providers of 
early intervention services), 1087ee(a)(2)(G) (teachers in math, science, foreign language, 
bilingual education, or other area of shortage as determined by state education officials), 
1087ee(a)(2)(K) (faculty at Tribal College or University), 1087ee(a)(2)(L) (librarian with a 
master’s degree in library sciences, employed either in a Title I school in a public library 
serving a geographic area that includes a Title I school), 1087ee(a)(2)(M) (speech 
pathologist with a master’s degree employed in a Title I school). See also 34 C.F.R. 
§§ 674.53 (2007), 55 (1994) (regulations for teacher cancellation), 674.57 (2009) (law 
enforcement and corrections officer and public defender cancellation), 674.58 (2009) (early 
childhood education cancellation), 674.59 (2009) (military service cancellation), 674.60  
(1999) (volunteer service cancellation), 674.56 (2009) (other qualifying employment 
cancellation). Applicable starting dates for qualifying service differ from program to 
program. 
 159. 34 C.F.R. § 674.52(c) (2007).  
 160. 20 U.S.C. § 1087ee(a)(3)(A)(i) (2009). The exceptions are as follows: volunteers 
are not entitled to the 30% discharge in the fifth year, Id.; § 1087ee(a)(3)(A)(iii), the 
discharge rate for special education teachers is fixed at 15% per year, Id.; § 1087ee(a)(3)(ii), 
and the discharge rate for service in a combat zone for a complete year ending before August 
14, 2008 is fixed at 12.5% per year and capped at 50%.  34 C.F.R § 674.59 (2009). 
 161. 20 U.S.C. § 1087ee(a)(3)(B) (2009). 
 162. 34 C.F.R. § 674.52(a) (2007). 
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before the date of acceleration.163  The school’s decision is not subject to 
administrative review, but the Department will provide “guidance” to the 
school if the school so requests.164  In De La Mota v. United States 
Department of Education, however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that such informal guidance is entitled to no deference in an Article III 
court.165  
The DOE does not review adverse school decisions. The De La Mota 
case involved APA review against the agency based on guidance it 
provided to the school;166 the court did not address reviewability, standing, 
or remedies.  The problem with APA review, of course, is that the school, 
not the agency, decides.  The prudent course is to sue the Department and 
the school under different theories—the Department under the APA, either 
for incorrectly interpreting the statute or for unlawfully withholding 
cancellation, and the school for injunctive relief for violation of the Higher 
Education Act, which instructs that Perkins loans “shall be cancelled” if its 
conditions are met.167 
III. Student Loans in Delinquency and Default 
Given the broad array of default-avoidance tools described in the last 
section, few, if any, borrowers should find themselves forced to default on 
their student loans.  And the default labyrinth is well worth avoiding.  One 
high-ranking Department official has described default as “an 
inconvenience for the government, but a tragedy for the borrower.”168  
Nevertheless, an incredible number of borrowers default.169 
                                                                                                     
 163. 34 C.F.R. § 674.52(c) (2007). 
 164. De La Mota v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 412 F.3d 71, 81 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 73. 
 167. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087ee(a)(2) (2009). 
 168. Kelly Field, Government Doesn’t Profit From Student-Loan Defaults, Budget 
Analysis Shows, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 14 2011), http://chronicle.com/ article/Budget-
Footnote-Government/126373/. 
 169. First Official Three-Year Student Loan Default Rates Published, U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC. (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/first-official-three-year-
student-loan-default-rates-published (noting that of the 4.1 million borrowers who entered 
repayment from October 2009 to September 2010, almost 375,000 defaulted by September 
30, 2011); see also Scott Cohn, Surging Student-Loan Debt is Crushing the System, 
CNBC.COM (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100598257 (noting that 6.8 million 
federal student loan borrowers are currently in default). 
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The consequences of default are serious indeed:  a borrower who 
defaults can expect to find herself with lower credit ratings and higher debt 
because of assessment of collection fees, costs, and penalties.  This Part 
begins by discussing some of these consequences and describing how 
student loans fall into default in the first place. 
Part of what makes federal student loan default particularly difficult 
for borrowers is the range of collection options available to creditors.  The 
federal government has an arsenal of powerful administrative tools at its 
disposal to collect student loans, one of which, garnishment, is also 
available to guaranty agencies.  Subpart B describes these administrative 
tools, as well as some others that may be available to different groups of 
lenders.  Finally, Subpart C deals with issues that arise with student loans in 
litigation, including the extent of federal preemption in federal student loan 
collection litigation. 
A. The Federal Student Loan Default Process and the Consequences of 
Default 
A borrower who misses a payment on a FFEL or Direct Loan is 
considered to be in delinquency.170 Department regulations identify 
collection efforts FFEL lenders must undertake while a loan is in various 
stages of delinquency;171 Direct loan servicers will likely engage in similar 
efforts.  Lenders are required to attempt to contact the borrower multiple 
times both by phone and mail.172  The content of the required notices varies, 
but generally it must inform the borrower of the possibility and 
consequences of default.173  At least some of the notices must include 
information to the borrower about options for avoiding default, including 
deferment, forbearance, income-sensitive and income-based repayment, and 
loan consolidation.174  Lenders must engage in collection activity at least 
once every forty-five days.175 
A FFEL or Direct loan is considered to be in default if the borrower is 
in delinquency for 270 days if the loan is repayable in monthly installments.  
                                                                                                     
 170. 34 C.F.R. § 682.411(b)(1) (2008). 
 171. 34 C.F.R. § 682.411 (2008). 
 172. 34 C.F.R.§ 682.411(c)–(f) (2008). 
 173. 34 C.F.R. § 682.411(d)(2), (e), (f) (2008). 
 174. 34 C.F.R. § 682.411(d)(1), (e) (2008). 
 175. 34 C.F.R. § 682.411(b)(2) (2008); see also 34 C.F.R.§ 682.411(j) (2008) 
(definition of collection activity). 
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Otherwise the loan is in default after 330 days.176  At least thirty days 
before filing a default claim on the loan and on or after the 241st day of 
delinquency, a lender must send the borrower a final demand letter 
“requiring repayment of the loan in full and notifying the borrower that a 
default will be reported to a national credit bureau.”177  When the lender 
places a borrower in default, the lender assigns the claim to the guaranty 
agency that insured it. 
Within forty-five days after being assigned a FFEL loan,178 the 
guaranty agency must send the borrower a detailed notice informing her of 
the status of the loan, demanding that she immediately begin repayment, 
warning her of impending collection activities, and explaining her rights to 
challenge adverse guaranty agency decisions regarding the loan as well as 
her options for removing the loan from default.179  Guaranty agencies must 
engage in “reasonable and documented collection activities,” which must 
occur at least once every 180 days for a non-paying borrower.180  Guaranty 
agencies must engage in the administrative collection efforts described later 
in this Part181 and may also collect loans through litigation.182 
For direct loans, the process is much simpler.  Under the terms of 
current Direct loan servicing contracts, loan servicers must perform 
“collection and default aversion activity” for delinquent loans.183  Once a 
loan reaches 360 days delinquency, the servicer must transfer the loan to 
the Department of Education’s Debt Management Collection System.184 
                                                                                                     
 176. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.102(b) (1994), 682.200 (1992). 
 177. 34 C.F.R. § 682.411(f) (2008). 
 178. 34 C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(6)(ii) (1992). 
 179. 34 C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(5)(ii)(A), (b)(5)(vi); see also 34 C.F.R. 682.410(b)(6)(iv) 
(requiring a separate notice informing the borrower of options for removing a loan from 
default). 
 180. 34 C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(6)(i) (2010).  
 181. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(6)(v), (vi) (a guaranty agency must attempt an annual 
Federal offset against eligible borrowers and must initiate administrative wage garnishment 
proceedings against eligible borrowers).  
 182. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(6)(vii) (a guaranty agency may file a civil suit against 
a borrower to compel repayment only if the borrower has no wages that can be garnished).  
 183. Direct Loan Servicing Contract with Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance 
Agency, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. Attachment A-1 at 15 (Jun. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/foia/contract/pheaa-061709.pdf [hereinafter PHEAA 
Contract]; see generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Loan Servicing Contracts, FED. STUDENT AID, 
available at http://studentaid.ed.gov/about/data-center/business-info/contracts/loan-servicing 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2014). 
 184. PHEAA Contract, supra note 183. 
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There is no “delinquency” period for a Perkins loan, which is 
considered to be in default when a borrower fails “to make an installment 
payment when due or to comply with other terms of the promissory note or 
written repayment agreement.”185  However, schools must engage in 
“billing procedures” described in Perkins regulations, a series of overdue 
notices informing the borrower of the delinquency and warning her that the 
school will process her account for collection and litigation.186 
If the borrower does not respond to the final demand letter, the school 
may initiate a series of “collection procedures,” starting with reporting the 
account to a national credit bureau as in default.187  In addition, a school 
may accelerate any defaulted loan with thirty days notice to the borrower188 
and may sue the borrower at any time. 189  A school may initially attempt to 
collect a defaulted loan on its own, but if it is unable to do so it must engage 
a collection firm or sue the borrower.190  Schools may also be required to 
sue defaulting alumni borrowers if other collection methods have failed and 
litigation is both feasible and cost effective.191 
The consequences of default for the borrower extend beyond those 
already described.  A borrower in default may find it difficult to obtain 
other credit products like car loans or mortgages, or even a job or a lease on 
a home or apartment.192  Defaults extend the loan repayment period, 
increasing interest costs for the borrower.193 Default also makes borrowers 
ineligible for deferments and certain cancellation and forgiveness 
programs.194  A student loan may also be accelerated upon default—the 
                                                                                                     
 185. 34 C.F.R. § 674.2 (2008).  
 186. 34 C.F.R. § 674.43(b), (c) (2009). Schools may dispense with the initial notices 
and send a final demand letter 15 days after a missed payment if the borrower has an 
unsatisfactory repayment history or the school reasonably concludes that the borrower does 
not intend to repay or to seek deferment, postponement, or cancellation. 34 C.F.R. 
§ 674.43(d). The school must also attempt at least one telephone contact before initiating 
collection procedures. 34 C.F.R. § 674.43(f). 
 187. 34 C.F.R. § 674.45(a)(1) (2008). 
 188. 34 C.F.R. § 674.43(e). 
 189. 34 C.F.R. § 674.46(a)(3) (2009). 
 190. 34 C.F.R. § 674.45(c)(1)(ii) (2008). 
 191. 34 C.F.R. § 674.46(a)(1), (2). 
 192. See Field, supra note 168 (noting how defaulting on student loans damage 
borrowers’ credit records).  
 193. See id. (stating that individuals who default on loans have to pay higher interest 
rates).  
 194. See, e.g., supra notes 53 (deferment), 101 (income-based repayment), 125 (public 
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entire amount of the loan becomes due immediately.195  One of the most 
serious consequences of default and delinquency for the borrower is that 
lenders may assess collection costs, fees, or penalties that the borrower 
must pay in addition to any principal and interest.  Default also renders a 
borrower ineligible to receive further federal assistance funds from any 
Title IV program, not just student loan programs.196 
B. Borrower liability for collection fees and penalties 
Creditors and collection agencies may attempt to charge collection 
costs, fees, and penalties to the borrower.  Any such attempt must be 
consistent both with the contract that created the loan and with any 
applicable statutes.  Different statutes regarding collection costs apply 
depending on the type of loan and who is collecting it.  For private student 
loan collection, this means generally applicable state or federal consumer 
protection laws and any state or federal consumer protection laws aimed at 
private student lenders.  For federal loans, particular federal statutes and 
regulations apply, depending on who is collecting the loan. 
The Department or a guaranty agency may assess “reasonable 
collection costs” against a borrower who defaults on a FFEL loan.197 For 
collection efforts by the Department and guaranty agencies, reasonable 
collection costs means actual costs incurred in collection.198  When a 
Private Collection Agency (“PCA”) collects a loan for the Department or a 
guaranty agency, the costs charged are based on a formula set by a 
regulation that is designed to estimate the average cost of PCA student loan 
collection.199  In 2009, a Department publication indicated an applicable 
                                                                                                     
service cancellation). 
 195. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.211(d)(1) (2013) (Direct); 674.31(b)(8) (2009) (Perkins). 
 196. 34 C.F.R. § 668.32(g)(1) (2011). Students may become eligible for Title IV 
assistance again by either repaying the debt in full or making six consecutive months of 
payments under a repayment agreement entered into with the holder of the loan in 
accordance with Title IV regulations. 34 C.F.R. § 668.35(a) (2008). 
 197. 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(b)(1) (2008); see also 34 C.F.R. § 30.60 (1988) (listing types of 
costs chargeable to debtors); 34 C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(2) (2013) (limiting collection costs that 
may be charged by guaranty agencies). 
 198. 34 C.F.R. § 30.60(a). “Actual costs” means what it says: the government is not 
permitted to assess costs that it doesn’t actually incur, such as filing fees in federal court. 
United States v. Spann, 797 F. Supp. 980 (1992). 
 199. 34 C.F.R. § 30.60(c), (d). The rate is calculated annually. Id. § 30.60(d). 
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rate of 24.34%.200  Collection costs are calculated based only on principal 
and interest, and not fees.201  Payments to guaranty agencies are applied 
first to the agency’s costs in collecting that amount, then to “other 
incidental charges” like late fees, and finally to accrued interest and 
principal.202  
There are limits on imposition and collection of costs and fees.  First, 
the Department of Treasury deducts fees from tax-refund offsets to cover its 
own administrative costs in running the offset programs, but PCAs do not 
receive a commission from these offsets.203  Second, the Department of 
Education may not impose fees inconsistent with the promissory note or its 
own student loan regulations, even if a statute generally applicable to the 
federal government permits those fees. 
FFEL Lenders may also tack collection costs onto a borrower’s debt if 
the promissory note provides for imposition of collection costs.204  These 
costs may not include “routine collection costs associated with preparing 
letters or notices or making personal contacts with the borrower.”205  FFEL 
lenders may also assess late charges on borrowers of up to six cents for 
each dollar of late installments, if the charge is authorized by the 
promissory note.206 
For Perkins Loans, each school is required to assess against borrowers 
“all reasonable costs incurred by the school with regard to a loan 
obligation.”207  This must be based on either actual costs for the borrower’s 
loan or average costs “for similar actions taken to collect loans in similar 
stages of delinquency.”208  Collections are capped at 30% of principal, 
interest, and late charges collected for first collection efforts and 40% of 
principal, interest, and late charges for subsequent collection efforts, 
                                                                                                     
 200. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PCA Procedures Manual: 2009 ED Collections Contract, 
FED. STUDENT AID 21 (2009), available at http://epic.org/foia/ed/EPIC-ED-2009-PCA-
Manual.pdf [hereinafter PCA Procedures Manual]. 
 201. Id. at 23. 
 202. 34 C.F.R. § 682.404(f) (2008). 
 203. PCA Procedures Manual, supra note 200.  
 204. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.202(g)(1) (2010) (stating a lender may require that the 
borrower pay costs incurred by the lender or its agents in collecting installments not paid 
when due if provided for in the borrowers promissory note). 
 205. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.202(g)(2) (referencing costs referred to in paragraph (g)(1)). 
 206. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.202(f). 
 207. 34 C.F.R. § 674.45(e)(1) (2008). 
 208. 34 C.F.R. § 674.45(e)(2). 
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including litigation.209  Court costs may also be charged and do not count 
toward the 40% cap.210  Under certain circumstances, a school may waive 
some or all collection costs according to the terms of a repayment 
agreement with the borrower.211 
C. Administrative Collection Procedures 
A borrower who defaults on federal student loans faces an array of 
non-judicial collection procedures that ordinary private debtors do not.  The 
Department of Education uses three tools.  Each diverts money from a 
different stream originally designated to flow to the borrower and applies 
that money to satisfy the debt.  This section will deal first with garnishment, 
in which the lender serves an order to the borrower’s employer to redirect 
some of the borrower’s wages to the lender.  Administrative garnishment is 
unique in that it is available to guaranty agencies as well as the government.  
Another administrative collection method is the tax refund offset.  Finally, 
the federal government can redirect benefits due to the borrower under 
certain federal statutes toward the payment of a defaulted student loan.  The 
remainder of this section takes up administrative collection procedures 
available on the state level, in particular, state tax refund offsets and 
professional license suspension. 
Except where otherwise stated, these procedures are not available 
when the borrower has defaulted on a private student loan. 
1. Administrative Wage Garnishment 
Two federal statutes—the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) and 
the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 (DCIA)—provide the 
Department of Education with authority to garnish wages of a borrower in 
default on federal student loans.212  Department regulations provide for 
garnishment only pursuant to the DCIA.213 Guaranty agencies may garnish 
wages, but only under the Higher Education Act.214  Thus, different bodies 
                                                                                                     
 209. 34 C.F.R. § 674.45(e)(3).  
 210. 34 C.F.R. § 674.45(e)(3)(iii).  
 211. See 34 C.F.R. § 674.47(d) (2009).  
 212. 20 U.S.C. § 1095a  (2006); 31 U.S.C. § 3720D (1996).  
 213. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 34.1–34.30 (2003) (citing as statutory authority the DCIA, and 
not the HEA). 
 214. 20 U.S.C. § 1095a(a). 
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of law govern garnishment of federal student loans, depending on whether 
the Department or a guaranty agency seeks garnishment.  
Many provisions of the DCIA and the HEA are identical. Both statutes 
cap garnishment at 15% of the borrower’s disposable pay.215 Both statutes 
require written notice to the borrower thirty days before the start of 
garnishment216 as well as an opportunity for a hearing, at which she may 
contest the existence, amount, or enforceability of the debt or the terms of 
any applicable repayment schedule.217 And both statutes require that the 
would-be garnishor provide the borrower an opportunity to agree to a 
written repayment agreement “under terms agreeable to” the lender in order 
to avoid garnishment.218 Borrowers may request a hearing to contest 
administrative garnishment at any time.219 However, garnishment will not 
be postponed pending the hearing unless the borrower’s request is timely.220 
If a borrower is involuntarily separated from employment and 
subsequently reemployed within twelve months, her pay may not be 
administratively garnished until she has been reemployed continuously for 
twelve months.221 A borrower may also object to the amount garnished by 
                                                                                                     
 215. 20 U.S.C. § 1095a(a)(1); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3720D(b)(1). 
 216. See 20 U.S.C. § 1095a(a)(2); 31 U.S.C. § 3720D(b)(2) (requiring notice giving the 
amount to be collected and the debtor’s rights); see also Administrative Wage Garnishment, 
34 C.F.R. §§ 34.4, 34.5 (2003) (mandating notice and its required components such as the 
amount outstanding); see also Fiscal, Administrative and Enforcement Requirements, 
682.410(b)(9)(i)(B) (2010) (requiring notice by mail to the last known address). 
 217. 20 U.S.C. § 1095a(a)(5), 31 U.S.C. § 3720D(b)(5) (requiring a hearing if the 
garnishment is timely objected within fifteen days); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 34.6(c)(1)–(2) 
(2003), 682.410(b)(9)(i)(E), (J) (2010) (allowing the debtor a hearing to contest the 
repayment schedule). 
 218. 20 U.S.C. § 1095a(a)(4) (2006); 31 U.S.C. § 3720D(b)(4) (1996); see also 34 
C.F.R. §§ 34.6(b), 682.410(b)(9)(i)(D) (summarizing that borrowers who agree to a 
repayment schedule but fail to make payments are subject to immediate garnishment, though 
they may request a hearing to raise hardship claims); see also PCA Procedures Manual, 
supra note 200, at 50, 53. 
 219. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 34.11(c) (2003), 682.410(b)(9)(i)(L) (stating that a hearing must 
be provided even if the request is not timely). 
 220. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 34.11 (a), (b), 682.410(b)(9)(i)(K) (explaining that a request for a 
hearing to contest DCIA garnishment is timely if made within 30 days of notice); see also 34 
C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(9)(i)(K) (detailing that a request for a hearing to contest HEA 
garnishment is timely if made within 15 days of notice); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 34.11(c)(2), 
682.410(b)(9)(i)(L) (describing that the Department or guaranty agency may also postpone 
garnishment despite an untimely request for a hearing if good cause exists to do so). 
 221. See 20 U.S.C. §1095a(a)(7); 31 U.S.C. § 3720D(b)(6); see also 34 C.F.R. 
§§ 34.6(c)(3), 682.410(b)(9)(i)(G) (detailing that DOE regulations prohibit a guaranty 
agency from garnishing such a borrower only when the guaranty agency knows that the 
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arguing that withholding that amount from pay would impose an undue 
hardship on her or her dependents.222  
In DCIA garnishment hearings, the burden of proof in establishing 
defenses or objections rests with the borrower.223 Department regulations 
are silent about the burden of proof in HEA garnishment proceedings 
brought by guaranty agencies. 
The Department provides borrowers with a list of objections it will 
consider in DCIA garnishment proceedings on its Request-for-Hearing 
form.224 That form lists the following objections in addition to those already 
discussed: the delinquent amount of the debt has been repaid in whole or in 
part, the debt is being paid under the terms of a repayment agreement, the 
debtor is in bankruptcy, the debt was discharged in bankruptcy, the debt is 
not the debtor’s, the debtor is entitled to statutory discharge of the debt, or 
the debt is not enforceable under state contract law. All but one of these 
objections must apply to HEA garnishment, because they raise a dispute as 
to the existence or amount of the debt or whether the debt is enforceable by 
garnishment or even enforceable at all. The one exception is entitlement to 
statutory discharge; however, an informal department manual indicates that 
a guaranty agency may not garnish if it finds grounds for statutory 
discharge.225 
The principal difference between DCIA garnishments by the 
Department of Education and HEA garnishments by guaranty agencies is in 
the hearing process itself. 
To request a hearing to contest DCIA garnishment, a borrower should 
use the “Request for Hearing” form provided by the department.226 The 
borrower may request an oral hearing, but an oral hearing will be provided 
only if the borrower can show that “the validity of the claim turns on the 
credibility or veracity of witness testimony,” such that documentary 
                                                                                                     
borrower is unemployed or has not continuously been employed for 12 months).  
 222. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 34.7(a), 34.14(c), 34.24 (2003) (requiring documentation to show 
undue hardship after garnishment). 
 223. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 34.14, 34.24(d)(1) (“You bear the burden of proving a claim of 
financial hardship by a preponderance of the credible evidence.”). 
 224. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Request For Hearing, FED. STUDENT AID, 
https://www.myeddebt.com/borrower/PDFFrames.jsp?fileName=form.AWG.Request.For.H
earing.pdf&pre_fill=Y (2011) [hereinafter Request]. 
 225. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., STUDENT LOAN LAW § 8.3.3.2 (4th ed. 2010 & 
2012 supp.) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ADMIN. WAGE GARNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2004)). 
 226. See Request, supra note 224. 
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evidence alone is not adequate to resolve disputed issues.227 If a borrower is 
allowed an oral hearing, she may choose whether to have the hearing in-
person or over the telephone.228 
“[A]ny qualified employee” of the Department may conduct a DCIA 
garnishment hearing.229 Department regulations characterize these hearings 
as “informal proceedings,” though witnesses are required to testify under 
oath or affirmation.230 The hearing official must maintain a summary record 
of the hearing231 and, within sixty days, issue a written decision based on 
the evidence and including the official’s “findings, analysis, and 
conclusions regarding objections raised to the existence or amount of the 
debt.”232 Reconsideration is available only if the borrower either offers new 
evidence supporting a previously-made and rejected objection or claims 
that the garnishment order imposes an undue hardship on her because of a 
material change in her financial circumstances after the contested 
garnishment order was issued.233 Judicial review of garnishment decisions 
is available under the Administrative Procedure Act.234  
In an HEA garnishment hearing, a guaranty agency may choose “any 
qualified individual, including an administrative law judge” to conduct the 
hearing, as long as that person is “not under the supervision or control of 
the head of the guaranty agency.”235 The borrower may choose between an 
oral or written hearing, and may appear by telephone at an oral hearing.236 
The guaranty agency must hold the hearing and render its decision in 
writing within sixty days of the borrower’s request for a hearing.237 
                                                                                                     
 227. 34 C.F.R. § 34.9(a)(2) (2003). 
 228. See 34 C.F.R. § 34.9(c)(1), (4) (describing that the borrower bears her own travel 
costs for an in-person hearing); see also § 34.9(c)(5) (stating that the agency bears the costs 
of telephone calls it places for a telephone hearing). 
 229. 34 C.F.R. § 34.13(a)(2) (2003). 
 230. 34 C.F.R. § 34.13(b)(1), (2). 
 231. See 34 C.F.R. § 34.13(b)(3). 
 232. 34 C.F.R. §§ 34.16(a), 34.17(a). 
 233. See 34 C.F.R. § 34.12(b)–(c) (2003) (stating additionally that filing for 
reconsideration does not halt the collection process). 
 234. See 34 C.F.R. § 34.17(b) (2003) (“The hearing official’s decision is the final 
action of the Secretary for the purposes of judicial review under the Administrative 
Procedure Act” (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06)). 
 235. 34 C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(9)(i)(M) (2010). 
 236. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(9)(i)(J) (stating that if the borrower opts for a hearing 
by telephone, the guaranty agency is responsible for telephonic charges).  
 237. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(9)(i)(L)–(N) (“The hearing official shall issue a final 
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The availability and scope of judicial review of guaranty agency 
decisions is unclear. APA review is not available against guaranty agencies, 
and neither the HEA nor DOE regulations governing HEA garnishment 
provide for judicial review of guaranty agency’s decisions.238 If the 
guaranty agency is an agency of state government, judicial review of the 
agency’s garnishment decisions may be available in state court under the 
state-law analogue to Administrative Procedure Act. Furthermore, if the 
guaranty agency is a state actor, the guaranty agency official responsible for 
issuing the garnishment order may be sued under section 1983239 or Ex 
Parte Young.240 
 Procedural due process arguments have found some purchase in the 
courts, and for good reason.241 Deciding a collections issue through 
administrative procedure otherwise available only to the government and 
sending a legally binding notice to an employer looks a lot like state action. 
And administrative adjudication without judicial review raises serious due 
process questions. In any event, if the garnishment was unauthorized by 
federal law, state law may provide a monetary remedy to recover wages 
improperly garnished.  
2. Federal Employee Salary Offsets 
When a current or former federal employee has defaulted on federal 
student loans, the government in effect becomes both garnishor and 
garnishee. Rather than garnishing itself, the government simply offsets the 
employee’s salary or retirement pay, by an amount up to 15% of disposable 
pay.242 The employee is entitled to thirty days’ notice and opportunity for a 
                                                                                                     
written decision at the earliest practicable date, but not later than sixty days after the 
guaranty agency’s receipt of the borrower’s hearing request.”). 
 238. See Brief for Nat’l Ass’n of Consumer Bankr. at 14, Attorneys as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004) 
(“However, unlike federal agency hearings or proceedings before the bankruptcy court, 
borrowers have no explicit right to judicial review of guaranty agency decisions.”).  
 239. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) (creating a cause of action to redress deprivation of 
federal rights by state actors).  
 240. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that state officials who violate 
federal law may be sued in federal court to enjoin further violation). 
 241. See, e.g., Hutchins v. United States, CIV-F-02-6256, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order Re: Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) or, in the 
alternative, for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 and Request for Judicial Notice (E.D. 
Cal., Apr. 16, 2004). 
 242. See 5 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1) (2008) (“The amount deducted for any period may not 
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hearing where she may contest the existence or amount of the debt or its 
enforceability by offset, or establish a defense of “extreme financial 
hardship.”243 The employee may also avoid offset by entering a repayment 
agreement with the Department.244 
3. Federal Income Tax Refund Offsets 
The Department of Treasury will offset a tax refund to pay a 
borrower’s “past-due, legally enforceable” debts owed to either the 
Department of Education or a guaranty agency.245 Before offset may occur, 
the Department must mail written notice to the debtor of the nature and 
amount of the debt, the Department’s intent to collect by offset, the debtor’s 
procedural rights should she decide to contest the offset, and her 
opportunity to avoid offset by entering a repayment agreement with the 
Department.246 A borrower who wishes to inspect and copy records must so 
request within twenty days after the date of notice.247 If the borrower wishes 
to contest the existence or amount of the debt, she must request review 
before sixty-five days following the date of notice or, if she timely 
requested to inspect records, fifteen days after the Department has made the 
records available for inspection, whichever is later.248 The borrower must 
include with this filing any documents that she would like the Secretary to 
consider at the hearing, and her request for an oral hearing, should she 
desire one.249 The Secretary will grant an oral hearing only if the disputed 
                                                                                                     
exceed 15 percent of disposable pay, except that a greater percentage may be deducted upon 
the written consent of the individual involved.”).  
 243. 5 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(2); 34 C.F.R. § 31.8 (1988). 
 244. See 5 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(2)(C); 34 C.F.R. § 31.10 (1988) (detailing the procedural 
requirements for avoiding an offset). 
 245. 31 U.S.C. § 3720A(a), (c) (1996) (requiring offset when debt is owed to a federal 
agency or a third party administrating a debt as an agent for the government). These 
procedures are not available to schools holding Perkins loans that are in default; however, 
offset is available to the government should the school assign the loan to it. 
 246. See 31 U.S.C. § 3720A(b); 34 C.F.R. §§ 30.22, 30.33 (1988) (listing the elements 
the notice to the debtor must contain). 
 247. See 34 C.F.R. § 30.33(c) (1988); see also 34 C.F.R. § 30.23 (1988) (stating that 
the debtor must specify which documents they wish to copy). 
 248. See 34 C.F.R. § 30.33(d), (f) (requiring that a debtor who wishes to enter a 
repayment agreement with the Secretary must enter such an agreement and make the first 
payment under the agreement by the same deadline). 
 249. 34 C.F.R. §§ 30.25(a), 30.33(e) (2014); see also 34 C.F.R. § 30.24 (explaining the 
procedures a debtor must follow in order to obtain a review of the existence or amount of 
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issues cannot be resolved by documentary evidence.250 If the debt is owed 
to a guaranty agency, the Secretary may provide for initial review by the 
guaranty agency. A borrower dissatisfied with the guaranty agency’s 
decision may then seek review with the Secretary within seven days of the 
guaranty agency’s determination.251 Following any review, the Secretary 
must provide the borrower with a decision in writing.252 Judicial review is 
available under the Administrative Procedure Act.253 
Defenses to tax-refund offset largely mirror those for other 
administrative collection procedures. In particular, eligibility for a school-
related discharge is a defense to tax refund offset.254 Hardship is not among 
listed defenses, and while the agency may consider it at its discretion, 
borrowers’ hardship arguments almost never succeed.255 
With one exception, taxpayers seeking to recover tax refunds that have 
already been offset to pay student loan debts must take their grievances up 
with the Department of Education, not the Treasury Department.256 The 
exception is that an innocent spouse must pursue a wrongfully withheld 
refund based on a jointly-filed return with the IRS.257 
4. Offsets to Federal Benefits 
If a borrower receives benefits from one federal agency but owes debts 
to another, the creditor agency may in certain circumstances demand a cut 
                                                                                                     
debt). A borrower who wants an oral hearing must provide reasons why review of 
documentary evidence is insufficient as well as a list of witnesses the debtor plans to call and 
what those witnesses will testify to. 34 C.F.R. § 30.25(b). 
 250. 34 C.F.R. § 30.25(c)(2); see also 34 C.F.R. § 30.26 (detailing procedures for an 
oral hearing). 
 251. 34 C.F.R. § 30.33(d)(3). 
 252. 34 C.F.R. §§ 30.24(e)(2), 30.26(c)(4). 
 253. 5 U.S.C. § 701–06 (2011). 
 254. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 225, at § 8.2.4 (discussing a 
borrower’s ability to raise school-related defenses).  
 255. See id. at § 5.2.2.3 (listing the permissible defenses). 
 256. See 26 U.S.C. § 6402(g) (2014) (noting that United States courts do not have 
jurisdiction over these matters and that they should be brought to the Federal agency to 
which the reduction was paid); 31 C.F.R. § 285.2(i) (detailing who has power to review tax 
refund offsets). 
 257. See Burgess v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 105-CV-98, 2006 WL 1047064, at *5 (D. 
Vt. Apr. 17, 2006) (noting that an injured spouse can pursue an administrative remedy 
through the Internal Revenue Service). 
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of the debtor’s benefits from the first agency.258 Like the tax refund offsets, 
benefits offsets are administered by the Treasury Department based on 
claims referred by claimant agencies. 
Offset is limited to the lesser of (1) the amount of the debt, including 
interest, penalties, and administrative costs, (2) 15% of the monthly benefit, 
and (3) the amount by which the monthly benefits exceed $750.259 But 
some federal benefits payments are exempted from offset entirely. Federal 
statutes exempt veterans’ benefits,260 Tier 2 Railroad Retirement benefits,261 
and payments under federal worker compensation programs, including most 
Black Lung benefits.262 As for Social Security benefits, Disability Insurance 
Benefits are subject to offset, but Supplemental Security Income benefits 
are not.263 Payments under student financial aid programs are also 
exempt,264 but that means little for a student-loan debtor since the 
Department of Education can garnish these payments on its own.265 The 
Secretary of the Treasury has authority to exempt payments under other 
programs from offset, and he has done so for a wide array of programs.266 
Even if the borrower’s benefit is not exempt from offset, she may request 
an offset for hardship.267 
Before the Department of Education requests the offset, it must send 
the borrower notice of its intent as well as provide her an opportunity to 
review the evidence.268 The procedures for review are the same as for tax 
                                                                                                     
 258. 31 U.S.C. § 3716 (2013). 
 259. 31 C.F.R. § 285.4(e) (2014). 
 260. 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a) (2013). 
 261. 45 U.S.C. § 231m (2013).  
 262. 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (2013); see also Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 
U.S.C. § 8130 (2013); Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 916 
(2013); Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7385a (2013). Benefits under Part B of the Black Lung Benefits Act—which applies only 
to claims made prior to 1974, see 30 U.S.C. § 924—are subject to offset. 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3716(c)(3)(A)(ii).  
 263. 31 U.S.C. § 3716(c)(3)(A); 31 C.F.R. § 285.4(a)(1). 
 264. 31 U.S.C. § 3716(c)(1)(C). Private parties are also prohibited from seizing or 
garnishing federal student aid payments, including student loan disbursements. 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1095a(d) (2013).  
 265. 20 U.S.C. § 1095a(d). 
 266. 31 U.S.C. § 3716(c)(3)(B). A list of exempt payments can be found on the 
Treasury Department’s website at http://www.fms.treas.gov/debt/dmexmpt.pdf. 
 267. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 214, at § 8.4.3.2 (discussing a student 
debtor’s options in requesting an offset).  
 268. 34 C.F.R. §§ 30.22, 30.24 (2014). 
COLLECTION OF STUDENT LOANS 251 
offsets,269 with the following exceptions. The deadline to reach a repayment 
agreement with the Secretary or to request review is twenty days after 
receiving notice, regardless of whether the borrower requested to review 
records.270 Documents supporting the borrower’s position must be filed by 
the same deadline, unless she has requested to review the records, in which 
case she must file any documents fifteen days after the Secretary makes the 
records available.271 
5. Virginia Statutory Setoff 
The Virginia Setoff Debt Collection Act provides a statutory “setoff” 
mechanism that allows claimant agencies—arms of state, county, city or 
town governments, state courts, and the Internal Revenue Service272—to 
collect debts from delinquent debtors from state tax refunds or lottery 
winnings due to the debtor.273 A state college or university must use this 
setoff procedure to collect defaulted student loans, unless it determines that 
the administrative cost of the procedure exceeds the amount of the 
delinquent debt.274 In the student loan context, statutory setoff may affect 
students or former students who have outstanding Perkins loans, fees, or 
other debts owed to state educational institutions. 
The procedure for setoff works as follows: A school holding a loan on 
which the borrower is delinquent notifies the Department of Taxation of the 
borrower’s delinquency. The Department of Taxation then determines 
whether the borrower is owed a tax refund and, if so, notifies the school of 
the amount of the refund and the address the borrower provided on her tax 
return.275 The school must, within ten days, mail written notification to the 
                                                                                                     
 269. The regulations for benefits offsets generally are provided in 34 C.F.R. §§ 30.20–
30.28. Those provisions also apply to tax refund offsets “as modified by” 34 C.F.R. § 30.33.  
 270. 34 C.F.R. § 30.24(a). 
 271. 34 C.F.R. § 30.24(d). 
 272. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-520 (2013). 
 273. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-523 (tax refunds), 58.1-535 (lottery winnings). If the 
claimant agency—the school in the case of student loans—itself holds funds due to the 
debtor, they may set off the delinquent debt from those funds before transferring them to the 
debtor. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-535; see also Virginia Polytechnic Inst. v. Interactive Return 
Serv., Inc., 626 S.E.2d 436, 438–40 (Va. 2006) (explaining the application of the Virginia 
Code). Despite its name, the statutory setoff provision functions as garnishment rather than 
offset except where the Commonwealth itself is the creditor. 
 274. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-521(B), 58.1-522. 
 275. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-524. 
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borrower of its intention to offset the refund. This notification must also 
state the basis for the school’s claim and inform the borrower of her right to 
contest the claim and the procedures for contesting it.276 The borrower has 
thirty days in which to request a hearing, at which she may dispute the 
validity and amount of the claim.277 No setoff may be made during the 
pendency of the hearing.278 If the borrower does not request a hearing 
within the statutory period, any objections to setoff are waived.279 No 
individual “involved in the prior circumstances which have culminated in 
[the] dispute” may hear the debtor’s claim.280 A borrower may seek judicial 
review of an adverse decision by the school in circuit court within thirty 
days after that decision becomes final.281 
The Setoff Debt Collection Act also establishes a priority system for 
resolving competing claims.282 Claims by state educational institutions take 
priority over claims by counties, cities, towns, and the IRS. Among claims 
of courts or administrative units of state government, such as public 
colleges and universities, priority is determined by the order in which the 
claimant agency files notice of its intent to seek setoff with the Department 
of Taxation. 
6. Professional License Suspension for Virginia Health Care Professionals 
Virginia law allows a creditor of a federal- or state-insured educational 
loan to, upon thirty days’ notice, petition the circuit court in the jurisdiction 
where the defaulting borrower resides “for an order suspending any license, 
certificate, registration, or other authorization to engage in a business, trade, 
profession, or occupation issued to the borrower by any health regulatory 
board within the Department of Health Profession.”283 The conditions for 
suspension are relatively stringent. In order to suspend a borrower’s license, 
the court must find that she actually has a license issued by a regulatory 
authority within the Department of Health Professions, and that she is 
delinquent in the payment of a loan guaranteed by either the federal 
                                                                                                     
 276. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-525. 
 277. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-525(B), 58.1-526(A). 
 278. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-526(B) (2013). 
 279. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-525(B). 
 280. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-526(C). 
 281. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-527(A). 
 282. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-530. 
 283. VA. CODE. ANN. § 54.1-2400.5(A), (B). 
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government or a state government.284 The court may not suspend the license 
if it finds that the creditor has recourse to an alternative remedy “that is 
likely to result in collection of the delinquency.”285 The court “may refuse 
to order the suspension” if suspending the borrower’s license would result 
in irreparable harm to her or to her employees or would not result in 
collection of the delinquency, or she “has made a good faith effort to reach 
an agreement with the” creditor.286 If the court finds against the borrower, 
she must surrender her license within ninety days.287 A borrower is entitled 
to have her license reinstated if she pays the delinquency or reaches an 
agreement with the creditor to pay the delinquency and makes at least one 
payment pursuant to that agreement.288  
Initiating a professional license suspension proceeding is an extreme 
step for a lender. License revocation or suspension may shut off a health 
care professional’s principal source of income, and likely with it her ability 
to pay her debts. The only conceivable reason a creditor might invoke this 
provision is to coerce payment from debtors who are able yet unwilling to 
pay their loans. Nevertheless, lenders in other states have used similar 
provisions to target debtors who have defaulted on federally-backed student 
loans.289 
The borrower’s labyrinth, formidable up to this point, becomes even 
more difficult to escape once she enters court.  
D. Judicial Collection Procedures 
All educational creditors are entitled to invoke the generally available 
procedures for collecting unpaid debts. Unsurprisingly, the United States 
prefers to utilize the array of administrative collection procedures the 
government has at its disposal over filing suit.290 Yet, it brings thousands of 
                                                                                                     
 284. VA. CODE. ANN.§ 54.1-2400.5(D) (2013). 
 285. VA. CODE. ANN.§ 54.1-2400.5(C). 
 286. Id. 
 287. VA. CODE. ANN. § 54.1-2400.5(D) 
 288. VA. CODE. ANN. § 54.1-2400.5(E). 
 289. See Emily Bregel, Loan Defaults Sting Tennessee Nurses, CHATTANOOGA TIMES 
FREE PRESS (Jan. 18, 2011), available at http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2011/ 
jan/18/loan-defaults-sting-nurses/?local (explaining that “[d]ozens of Tennessee nurses have 
had their licenses suspended for ignoring student loans”). 
 290. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, U.S. Government Receivables and Debt Collection 
Activities of Federal Agencies: Fiscal Year 2009 Report to the Congress 14 (2010), 
available at http://fmsq.treas.gov/news/reports/debt09.pdf (indicating that just one percent of 
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student loan collection cases in federal court each year. Between 2008 and 
2012, the government brought around 15,000 actions in federal court to 
collect on defaulted student loans.291  
The government’s student loan debt collection activity is concentrated 
in a small number of judicial districts; the top nine districts for student loan 
cases accounted for more than 86% of filings in 2012.292 Most of these 
lawsuits are brought in the government’s name by private law firms, 
pursuant to a statute that allows the justice department to contract collection 
services to such firms.293 The uneven distribution of cases is due to the fact 
that this program has not been implemented in every judicial district.294 
Private parties may bring collection litigation in their own names. The 
federal government may assign defaulted student loans to Private 
Collection Agencies (PCAs),295 which may sue the borrower in state or 
federal court. Guaranty agencies and schools holding defaulted Perkins 
                                                                                                     
federal student loan collections in FY 2009 were made directly through litigation). 
 291. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, Table C-2A: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases 
Commenced, by Nature of Suit, During the 12-Month Periods Ending September 30, 2008 
Through 2012 (2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/Judicial 
Business/2012/appendices/C02ASep12.pdf. Table C-2A indicates that 15,045 actions were 
commenced in federal district court with a nature of suit flag indicating “Recovery of 
Defaulted Student Loans.” Id. However, a small number of these cases were filed by private 
parties against the government. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, Table C-9: U.S. District 
Courts—Recovery of Overpayment and Enforcement of Judgment Cases Filed During the 
12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2012 (2012), available at http://www.us 
courts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/C09Sep12.pdf. 
 292. Id. 
 293. See 31 U.S.C. § 3718 (2011) (explaining that “[u]nder [certain] conditions . . . a 
contract [may be formed] with a person for collection service[s] to recover indebtedness 
owed . . . [to] the United States Government”); see also David Jesse, Beware, Metro Detroit: 
The Feds are Out -- And Looking for Payback on Late Student Loans, DETROIT FREE PRESS 
(Jan. 28, 2013), available at http://www.freep.com/article/20121007/NEWS06/101280006/ 
(describing the private counsel program’s history). Private attorneys pursuing debt collection 
pursuant to a contract with the government are subject to the provisions of the federal debt 
collection practices act. Id. § 3718(b)(6). But the federal government and its own employees 
are not, 15 U.S.C. § 1629a(6)(C) (2010). 
 294. Jesse, supra note 293 (noting that the student loan program has recently been 
“expanded to 19 districts nationwide”). 
 295. For more thorough information on private collection agencies and student loans, 
the reader is encouraged to refer to the Department of Education’s 2009 Private Collection 
Agencies Procedures Manual, available at http://epic.org/foia/ed/EPIC-ED-2009-PCA-
Manual.pdf. 
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loans may also attempt to collect loans through litigation.296  And litigation 
represents the primary recourse for private student lenders. 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau will have authority to 
supervise non-bank student loan servicers beginning in March 2014, which 
is when this article goes to press. The CFPB will forward borrowers’ 
complaints to the company, which has 15 days to respond.297 While this 
article was in its final stages, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
sued a for-profit alleging misconduct in its practice of channeling its 
students into private loans that were likely to default.298 
To access judicial collection procedures like execution and 
garnishment, the creditor must convert its debt to a judgment. It does this 
by filing a lawsuit against the borrower. At this stage, the borrower may 
resort to state law defenses available to any other contract defendant, except 
those preempted by federal statute.299 
1. Affirmative defenses 
Some state law defenses are expressly preempted. A borrower may not 
avoid repayment of federal student loans on state-law minority or infancy 
grounds.300 Also, borrowers may not assert the statute of limitations against 
any action to collect on a federal student loan debt brought by the 
government, a guaranty agency, or (in the case of Perkins loans) a school.301  
                                                                                                     
 296. 34 C.F.R. § 682.410 (2014) (“A guaranty agency may file a civil suit against a 
borrower to compel repayment only if [certain conditions are met].”); see also 34 C.F.R. § 
674.46(a)(2) (“The institution shall sue the borrower [of a defaulted Perkins loan] if it 
determines that [certain conditions] are met.”). 
 297. Andy Thomason, Watchdog Agency to Monitor Largest Nonbank Student-Loan 
Servicers, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, December 13, 2013; Michelle Singletary, 
Bureau Will Be Powerful Ally in The Corner of Student-loan Borrowers in March, THE 
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 4, 2013 at A14. 
 298. Kelly Field, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Sues ITT as Predatory Lender, 
Feb. 17, 2014.] 
 299. Cf. Gibbs v. SLM Corp., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8–9 (D. Mass. 2004) (holding that 
state statute of limitations barred borrower’s action to avoid repayment of his student loans); 
In re Mason, 300 B.R. 160, 165–69 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2003) (applying Connecticut law to 
void consolidation that was obtained through duress); 71 Fed. Reg. 45,666, 45,676–77 (Aug. 
9, 2006) (arguing that regulations protecting borrowers from forgery are unnecessary 
“because relief is already available for those instances under the common law (and in many 
instances, State law) defense of forgery”). 
 300. 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(b)(2), (3) (2008). 
 301. Id. § 1091a(a)(2). One court has held that the bar on statutes of limitations applies 
to actions brought by third-party assignees (such as collection agencies), see Mountain Peaks 
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What about the equitable defense of laches? Laches under federal law 
requires that the plaintiff’s unreasonable delay caused prejudice to the 
defendant. Prejudice may not be presumed from the length or 
unreasonableness of the delay.302 If, however, state law permits such a 
presumption, and that presumption might be decisive in the case, the 
borrower may argue that state law, not federal law, should apply. 
The federal statute’s text is ambiguous. It says only that “no limitation 
shall terminate the period” that the lender may have to sue a borrower.303 
Laches is a time bar, but not a “limitation.” But the overwhelming weight 
of authority rejects borrowers’ laches arguments against student lenders. 
Five federal circuits have read the statute broadly to exclude laches.304 One 
district court has applied laches to bar a lawsuit to enforce a federal student 
loan obligation.305 
A weaker, but still alluring argument against laches in student-loan 
collection cases where the government is the plaintiff is the “well settled” 
rule “that the United States is not … subject to the defense of laches in 
enforcing its rights.”306 Two federal circuits have genuflected at this maxim 
                                                                                                     
Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Roth-Steffen, 778 N.W.2d 380, 386–87 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), but a 
contrary reading of the statute is plausible, too. 
 302. Save the Peaks Coal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 669 F.3d 1025, 1033 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A 
lengthy, unexpected delay that does not result in prejudice is not a sufficient basis for laches 
to apply.”); Cornetta v. United States, 851 F.2d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Even lengthy 
delay does not eliminate the prejudice prong of laches test.”); see also Clearfield Trust Co. v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366, 369–70 (1943) (“[D]amages occasioned by the delay must 
be established and not left to conjecture.”). 
 303. 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(a)(2). 
 304. See, e.g., United States v. Tuerk, 317 Fed. Appx. 251, 253 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(explaining that “Congress intended to allow recovery on a broad range of student loan debts 
by eliminating all limitations”); United States v. Lawrence, 276 F.3d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 
2001) (following other circuits in “concluding that § 1091a eliminates all limitation[] 
defenses for collection of student debts”); United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (explaining that Congress provided for an action to collect on defaulted student 
loans not subject to statute of limitations); United States v. Glockson, 998 F.2d 896, 897 
(11th Cir. 1993) (explaining that amendments to the statute indicated an intent to remove the 
statute of limitations); United States v. Hodges, 999 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1993) (concluding 
that amendments removed the pre-1991 statute of limitations); Cf. Proctor v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., 196 Fed. Appx. 345, 349 (6th Cir. 2006) (declining to decide whether laches is 
applicable against the government and affirming the district court on the grounds that the 
defendant could not establish the elements of a laches defense as a matter of law).  
 305. See United States v. Rhodes, 788 F. Supp. 339, 342–43 (E.D. Mich.1992) 
(applying the equitable defense of laches to a seventeen year old student loan collection). 
 306. See United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940) (concluding that the 
fact that “the claim was acquired by the United States through operation of the National 
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and rejected defendants’ laches arguments.307 But the rule is far from “well-
settled,” for the Court has approved the viability of laches as a defense to 
federal government claims in several cases.308 The applicability of laches 
seems to turn largely on whether the federal government acts in a 
“proprietary” rather than “sovereign” capacity,309 though the line between 
what is proprietary and what is sovereign is far from clear. 
Courts have generally refused to allow a borrower to raise grounds for 
statutory discharge as a defense in collection litigation, on the theory that 
discharge is a matter within the jurisdiction of the agency that courts may 
consider only on judicial review.310 A borrower who is facing a collection 
action but who may also have a viable claim for discharge should promptly 
seek discharge before the agency and ask the court to stay the collection 
litigation pending resolution of the administrative discharge petition. 
 
 
                                                                                                     
Housing Act” did not “take the case out of the rule”). 
 307. See United States v. Tuerk, 317 Fed. Appx. 251, 253 (3d Cir. 2009) (conveying a 
belief that, even if the statute did not bar the defense of laches, the plaintiff would be unable 
to utilize it against the United States); United States v. Di Stefano, 279 F.3d 1241, 1245 n.2 
(10th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “laches may not be asserted against the United States in an 
action brought to enforce a public right or a public interest”). A district court, albeit in 
dictum, suggested that a guaranty agency’s stale claim could be revived by assignment to the 
Department of Education. United States v. Robbins, 819 F. Supp. 672, 677–79 (E.D. Mic. 
1993). 
 308. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 369–70 (1943) 
(finding that, while laches is available the action brought by the United States, it must be 
proven and is not presumed due to length of time lapse). 
 309. See United States v. Peoples Household Furnishings, Inc., 75 F.3d 252, 255 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. California, 507 U.S. 746, 757–59 (1993) (proving that the 
Supreme Court had distinguished Summerlin, but left the general rule intact)); see also 
Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 369 (“The United States does business on business terms”) 
(quoting United States v. Nat’l Exchange Bank, 270 U.S. 527, 534 (1926))). 
 310. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 87 F. Supp. 2d 464, 466 (D. Md. 2000) (“Only 
the Secretary, not this Court, has discretion to [administratively] discharge the loan.”); In re 
Scholl, 259 B.R. 345, 349 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001) (“Ultimately, the Secretary of Education 
is initially responsible for determining whether the student loan described in the present case 
should be discharged.”); In re Bega, 180 B.R. 642, 644 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995) (finding the 
statute required the plaintiff to follow the administrative regulations in order to obtain a 
discharge from the Secretary). Some of the grounds for discharge—notably false 
certification based on identity theft or forgery—overlap with state law contract defenses. 
The buyer can raise these defenses notwithstanding the availability of the discharge 
procedure. 
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2. Post-Judgment Remedies 
Once the student-loan creditor has a judgment, it becomes a judgment 
creditor and may employ the statutory collection tools of fieri facias or 
execution,311 garnishment,312 and judgment lien.313  A federal judgment 
creditor may use state-law collection techniques pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 69. 
The student loan debtor, now also a judgment debtor, has little 
recourse, unless she can have the judgment vacated. The primary refuges of 
a defaulting student loan debtor—consolidation and rehabilitation—are not 
available to the judgment debtor.  
Since many student borrowers will not appear even if served, a lawyer 
will be well advised to be familiar with the procedures to reopen a default 
judgment. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a defendant to 
obtain relief from a judgment or order for one of the following six reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, 
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); 
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; 
(4) the judgment is void; 
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is 
based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or 
applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or 
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.314 
The defendant must move to vacate the judgment within a “reasonable 
time,” and within one year if she seeks to set aside the judgment for one of 
the first three reasons.315 The defendant bears the burden of proving not 
                                                                                                     
 311. Doug Rendleman, ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND LIENS IN VIRGINIA, ch. 2 (2d 
ed. 1994) [hereinafter RENDLEMAN, EJL-V 2D]; Doug Rendleman, ENFORCEMENT OF 
JUDGMENTS AND LIENS IN VIRGINIA, ch. 3 (3d ed. forthcoming Fall 2014) [hereinafter 
RENDLEMAN, EJL-V 3D].  
 312. RENDLEMAN, EJL-V 2D, ch. 3; RENDLEMAN, EJL-V 3D, at ch. 4. 
 313. RENDLEMAN, EJL-V 2D, ch. 4; RENDLEMAN, EJL-V 3D, at ch. 5. 
 314. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). 
 315. Id. 
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only that she meets one of the six reasons and that the motion was timely, 
but also that she has a meritorious defense and that the plaintiff would not 
suffer unfair prejudice from vacating the default.316 However, when a 
defaulting defendant has shown a meritorious defense, courts construe the 
enumerated grounds for relief liberally.317 
IV. Exiting Default 
Borrowers unfortunate enough to find themselves in default on their 
loans have two primary options for exiting of default: consolidation and 
rehabilitation. Consolidation involves taking out a new loan to pay off the 
defaulted loan. Rehabilitation involves restoring the defaulted loan to 
regular repayment status. In addition to these two options, which are 
discussed in this section, a borrower may also pursue discharges described 
in the following section. 
A. Consolidation 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines debt consolidation as “[t]he 
replacement of multiple loans from one or more lenders with a single loan 
from one lender, usually with a lower monthly payment and a longer 
repayment period.”318 A federal student-loan borrower may consolidate her 
federal loans by taking out a consolidation loan. She and her loans must 
meet the eligibility requirements, and she must apply to the Secretary of 
Education for a Direct Consolidation loan.319 
All HEA loans, including consolidation loans themselves, may be 
consolidated, as may Auxiliary Loans to Assist Students (ALAS), Health 
Education Assistance Loans (HEAL), and certain loans made under the 
Public Health Service Act.320 However, a Direct Consolidation Loan cannot 
be consolidated by itself, but must be consolidated with another eligible 
loan.321 FFEL consolidation loans may be consolidated into a Direct Loan 
                                                                                                     
 316. Park Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 812 F.2d 894, 896 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 317. Compton v. Alton Steamship Co., 608 F.2d 96, 102 (4th Cir. 1979) (quoting 
Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123, 130 (4th Cir. 1969)). 
 318. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 319. 34 C.F.R. § 685.220(e) (2014). Consolidation loans are no longer made under the 
defunct FFEL program, though borrowers may have FFEL consolidation loans outstanding. 
 320. 34 C.F.R. § 685.220(b). 
 321. 34 C.F.R. § 685.220(d)(2). 
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under some circumstances, in order to allow borrowers to access repayment 
plans available for Direct Loans but not FFELs.322 Finally, a Perkins loan 
may not be consolidated by itself—at least one FFEL or Direct Loan must 
also be involved.323 
A Direct Consolidation Loan is divided into subsidized, unsubsidized, 
and PLUS components, each component representing the portion of the 
loan that paid off underlying loans of that particular type.324 The interest 
rates for each component of a consolidation loan correspond roughly to the 
interest rates on the type of loan underlying that component.325 
A borrower not in default may consolidate at any time.326 A borrower 
in default may consolidate provided that she either agrees to repay the 
consolidation loan under an ICR or IBR plan or makes “satisfactory 
repayment arrangements”—which means three consecutive “on-time 
voluntary full monthly payments.”327 A borrower may not consolidate loans 
when she is subject to a judgment on a federal student loan that has not 
been vacated, or an administrative wage garnishment order on an HEA loan 
that has not been lifted.328 
Consolidation is no panacea. Interest and authorized penalties and 
fees, as well as the principal, of the loans being consolidated are all 
included in the principal balance of the consolidation.329 This effectively 
capitalizes all interest, penalties, and fees of the consolidated loan. 
Consolidating defaulted loans will cause the borrower’s credit report to 
indicate that the loan was in default but paid in full.330 Additionally, 
consolidation can eliminate certain repayment and cancellation options. For 
example, a Direct Consolidation loan that pays off a Perkins loan and 
another kind of loan is not eligible for Perkins loan cancellation. Also, a 
                                                                                                     
 322. 34 C.F.R. § 685.220(d)(1)(i)(B)(3)–(5). 
 323. 34 C.F.R. § 685.220(d)(1)(i).  
 324. 34 C.F.R. § 685.220(c). Perkins and non-HEA loans are consolidated into the 
unsubsidized component. Id. § 685.220(c)(2). 
 325. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.220(g) (2014), 685.202(a)(3). 
 326. 34 C.F.R. § 685.220(d)(1)(ii)(A)–(B). 
 327. 34 C.F.R. § 685.220(d)(1)ii)(C). The full monthly payment amount must be 
“reasonable and affordable based on the buyer’s circumstances.” Id. 
 328. 34 C.F.R. § 685.220(d)(1)(ii)(E)–(F). 
 329. 34 C.F.R. § 685.220(f)(1), (3). 
 330. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Direct Consolidation Loans: Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://loanconsolidation.ed.gov/help/faq.html (last viewed Feb. 23, 2014). 
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consolidation loan that pays off a Parent PLUS loan and any other kind of 
loan is not eligible for income-based or pay-as-you-earn repayment.  
On the other hand, consolidation may be an appropriate course of 
action for some borrowers. Many borrowers with FFEL loans may become 
eligible for an income-based or pay-as-you-earn repayment plan by 
consolidating the FFEL loans into a Direct Consolidation loan. For 
borrowers in default, consolidation is quicker than rehabilitation, which 
follows, and it does not require negotiating a repayment schedule with the 
creditor. 
B. Rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation allows a borrower who is in default on her student loans 
to get out of default by making “appropriate and timely monthly 
payments.”331 A borrower who wishes to rehabilitate her student loans 
should consult applicable regulations332 as well as the Department of 
Education’s PCA Procedures Manual, which contains a chapter on loan 
rehabilitation.333 Loans that have been reduced to a judgment may not be 
rehabilitated,334 and loans that have been rehabilitated once since August 
14, 2008 may not be rehabilitated a second time if the borrower 
subsequently goes into default.335 
A borrower may rehabilitate a FFEL or Direct Loan by making nine 
consecutive “voluntary, reasonable, and affordable monthly payments 
within 20 days of the due date within ten consecutive months.”336 What 
constitutes a “reasonable and affordable monthly payment” is determined 
based on the amount owed and the borrower’s individual circumstances, 
including the borrower’s income and “reasonable and necessary 
expenses.”337 Regulations provide that, in order to be rehabilitated, a FFEL 
                                                                                                     
 331. PCA Procedures Manual, supra note 200, at 87. 
 332. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.211(f) (Direct), 682.405, 674.39. 
 333. PCA Procedures Manual, supra note 200, at Ch. 9. 
 334. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.211(f)(3), 682.405(a)(1). 
 335. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.211(f)(4), 682.405(a)(3). 
 336. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.211(f)(1), 682.405(a)(2). A borrower who misses one payment 
will still be entitled to rehabilitation. 
 337. 20 U.S.C. § 1078-6(a)(1)(B) (2010); 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.311(f)(1), 682.405(a)(2); 
See PCA Procedures Manual, supra note 200, at 103. Depending on the size of the loan and 
whether the loan is a FFEL or Direct Loan, a certain percentage of the balance to be 
rehabilitated will be considered “reasonable and affordable.” Id. at 94, 111–12. These 
“minimum payment amounts” may be reduced in special circumstances. Id. at 92, 109–10. A 
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loan must be sold to an eligible lender.338 Because the statute only provides 
that a loan must be sold to an eligible lender if practicable,339 and because 
regulations do not require sale of Direct Loans as a condition precedent to 
rehabilitation, the National Consumer Law Center has characterized this 
requirement as “ripe for legal challenge.”340  
To rehabilitate a defaulted Perkins loan, a borrower must make nine 
consecutive on-time monthly payments.341 The school must return the 
borrower to regular repayment status within thirty days after receiving the 
last on-time monthly payment.342 A Perkins loan that has been reduced to a 
judgment may not be rehabilitated.343 Additionally, Perkins loans may be 
rehabilitated only once.344 
V. Discharging Student Loans 
There are two ways borrowers may potentially discharge their student 
loan debt: statutory discharge under certain provisions of the Higher 
Education Act, and discharge in bankruptcy. Neither is particular easy to 
obtain.  
A. Statutory Discharge 
1. School-Related Discharges 
Student loans received after January 1, 1986 may qualify for a school-
related discharge on one of three grounds: school closure, false 
certification, and unpaid refund.345 The common link between these three 
                                                                                                     
borrower who is subject to unaffordable “minimum payments” could potentially challenge 
the payments as inconsistent with the statute, which bars a guaranty agency or the Secretary 
from requiring the buyer to pay “more than is reasonable and affordable based on the 
borrower’s total financial circumstances.” 20 U.S.C. § 1078-6(a)(1)(B). Since the minimum 
payment amounts are set forth in a manual, rather than a formal rule, they should receive 
Skidmore-Mead deference, rather than Chevron deference, on judicial review. 
 338. 34 C.F.R. § 682.405(a)(2)(ii). 
 339. 20 U.S.C. § 1078-6(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
 340. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 217, at § 6.3.5. 
 341. 34 C.F.R. § 674.39(a)(2). 
 342. 34 C.F.R. § 674.39(b)(1). 
 343. 34 C.F.R. § 674.39(a). 
 344. 34 C.F.R. § 674.39(e). 
 345. 20 U.S.C. § 1087(c) (2010). 
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grounds for discharge is that they involve a school’s misconduct or failure 
to perform contractual obligations.346  
If the decision-maker is satisfied that the borrower has met the 
requirements set forth in statute and regulation, the borrower’s obligation to 
repay the loan is discharged. In exchange for discharge, the borrower 
assigns all claims to a refund for the discharged sum to the Secretary347 and 
agrees to cooperate with the Secretary’s efforts to enforce these rights.348 
Closed School. School closure discharge relieves borrowers of the 
obligation to repay federal loans taken out to finance an educational 
program that they were unable to complete because the school offering the 
program closed.349  A borrower is not eligible for discharge, however, if she 
completes or is in the process of completing her course of study either 
through a “teach-out” at another school or by transferring credits from the 
closed school to another school.350 
To obtain a discharge, a borrower must submit to the holder of the loan 
a request for discharge along with a sworn statement declaring that she 
meets each of the criteria for eligibility.351 A borrower may be ineligible for 
discharge if she obtained the loan by fraudulent means.352 The borrower 
                                                                                                     
 346. False certification because of identity theft, which was not in the original school-
related discharge provision but added later, is arguably an exception to this general 
observation. 
 347. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.214(e), 685.215(c)(6)(ii), 685.216(c)(1)(iii)(B), 682.402(d)(5), 
682.402(e)(5), 682.402(l)(4)(iii)(B), 674.33(g)(7). Administrative unpaid refund and false 
certification discharges are not available for Perkins loans, but borrowers should be able to 
raise these matters as defenses or counterclaims in litigation. 
 348. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.214(d), 685.215(c)(6)(ii), 685.216(c)(1)(iii)(B), 682.402(d)(4), 
682.402(e)(4), 682.402(l)(4)(iii)(B), 674.33(g)(6). 
 349. 20 U.S.C. § 1087(c); 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.214(b), 682.402(d)(2), 674.33(g)(2). The 
borrower qualifies for discharge if she was attending the school when it closed or if she 
withdrew from the school not more than 90 days before it closed, a deadline that can be 
extended in extraordinary circumstances at the Secretary’s discretion. 34 C.F.R. 
§§ 685.214(f)(1), 682.402(d)(1), 674.33(g)(4)(i)(B). A school’s closure date is the date on 
which the school “ceases to provide education instruction in all programs, as determined by 
the Secretary. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.214(a)(2)(i), 682.402(d)(1)(ii)(A), 674.33(g)(1)(ii)(A). The 
Secretary maintains a list of closure dates on its website. www2.ed.gov/offices 
/OSFAP/PEPS/docs/closedschoolsearch.xlsx. 
 350. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.214(c)(1)(iii), 682.402(d)(3)(ii)(C), 674.33(g)(4)(i)(C). 
Regulations define a teach-out plan as “a written plan developed by an institution that 
provides for the equitable treatment of students if [the institution] ceases to operate before all 
students have completed their program of study….” 34 C.F.R. § 602.3. 
 351. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.214(c)(1), 682.402(d)(3)(ii), 674.33(g)(4)(i). 
 352. 34 C.F.R. § 674.33(g)(5) (Perkins). The regulations for Direct and FFEL loans do 
not contain such a provision. 
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must state whether she has made any claims against third parties relating to 
the school closure, transfer any claims against third parties to the Secretary, 
or the Secretary’s designee, and promise to comply with the cooperation 
requirement.353 
If the Secretary holds a loan, he determines eligibility for closed-
school discharge in the first instance.354 A school that holds a Perkins loan 
initially determines the borrower’s eligibility for discharge of that loan, but 
the borrower has the right to de novo review before the Secretary.355 
Judicial review of the Secretary’s closed-school discharge decision is 
available under the APA.356 
For FFEL loans held by lenders or guaranty agencies, the guaranty 
agency makes the final determination of eligibility.357 Regulations do not 
provide for review of guaranty agency closed-school discharge 
determinations by either the Department or the courts.358 FFEL loans may 
be discharged without application if the borrower has received a closed-
school discharge on a Direct or Perkins Loan.359  
False Certification and Identity Theft. A borrower may obtain a false 
certification discharge where the student’s eligibility for federal student 
loans “was falsely certified by the eligible institution or was falsely 
certified as a result of a crime of identity theft[.]”360 False certifications fall 
into three general categories. First, the school certifies an ineligible student 
as eligible for a loan. Second the school, without authorization from the 
student, signs a student’s name to a student loan-related document or 
otherwise authorizes a transaction on the student’s behalf. Third, the school 
certifies a student’s eligibility for a student loan as a result of identity theft. 
                                                                                                     
 353. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.214(c)(2), (3) (Direct); 682.402(d)(3)(i), (iii), (iv) (FFEL); 
674.33(g)(4)(ii), (iii) (Perkins). 
 354. 34 C.F.R. § 685.214(g)(5), (6). 
 355. 34 C.F.R. § 674.33(g)(8). 
 356. 5 U.S.C. § 701–706. 
 357. 34 C.F.R. §§ 682.402(d)(6)(i)(G), (H), 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(E), (F). 
 358. The Department of Education’s Student Aid website indicates that the holder of 
the loan makes the “final decision” in all cases except those involving false certification and 
forged signature for FFEL or Direct Stafford Loans.  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Forgiveness, 
Cancellation, and Discharge, FED. STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/ 
PORTALSWebApp/students/english/discharges.jsp (last visited Feb. 13, 2014). 
 359. 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(d)(8).  Perkins loans are also subject to discharge by the 
Secretary without application in limited circumstances.  34 C.F.R. § 674.33(g)(3). 
 360. 20 U.S.C. § 1087(c)(1). 
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False certification of ineligible students is a serious and still a common 
problem.361 It may involve a range of misconduct, from assisting students in 
obtaining GEDs and diplomas from diploma mills362 to blatant tampering 
with and encouraging cheating on standardized eligibility tests.363 If a 
school certifies a student who does not meet the criteria set forth in 20 
U.S.C. § 1091 or 34 C.F.R. § 668.32, then the student is entitled to a false 
certification discharge.364 
Recent changes in eligibility regulations should curtail some of the 
worst abuses. From January 1, 1986 to July 1, 2012, a non-high-school 
graduate could take out a student loan if the school certified the student’s 
“ability to benefit” as defined by statute at the time of certification and 
enrollment.365 However, under the 2011 amendments to the Higher 
Education Act, only those with a high school diploma “or the recognized 
equivalent” or those who have completed a secondary school education, as 
determined by state law, in a home-school setting are eligible to receive 
student loans.366  
Even if she meets federal eligibility requirements, a student may be 
ineligible for loans for job-specific training programs because state law bars 
her from holding the position for which the training program is intended. If 
a school certifies a student who is not qualified under state law for the 
intended occupation because of criminal history, physical or mental 
                                                                                                     
 361. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-600, PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS:  
STRONGER DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO HELP ENSURE ONLY 
ELIGIBLE STUDENTS RECEIVE FEDERAL STUDENT AID, 22–25 (2009), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09600.pdf; see also, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. 
DEP’T OF EDUC., JURY RETURNS GUILTY VERDICTS IN FRAUD CASE (June 30, 2004), 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/invtreports/mi062004.html (detailing a fraud 
scheme that cost the Department of Education approximately $1,000,000). 
 362. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 247, at 26–28 (describing the 
problems associated with diploma mills and GED assistance). 
 363. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 247, at 22–25 (telling that 
numerous nefarious practices occur and how they might result in otherwise ineligible 
students receiving federal aid). 
 364. See Jordan v. Sec’y of Educ., 194 F.3d 169, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[T]he statutory 
scheme is designed to place obligations . . . on the government, which must police schools to 
ensure that their certifications are accurate, or failing that must compensate defrauded 
students.”). 
 365. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(e)(13) (setting out different ability to benefit tests that 
apply for loans taken out at different times). 
 366. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(d).  Certification based on home school education alone is 
available for loans received on or after July 1, 2000, provided the student meets the specified 
requirements.  34 C.F.R. §§ 668.32(e)(4), 682.402(e)(13)(ii)(A). 
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condition, age, or other reason accepted by the Secretary, the student is 
entitled to discharge of the loan.367 The student must be ineligible under the 
law of the state of the student’s residence at the time of certification.368 This 
narrow ground for discharge applies only if the borrower’s education 
“specifically and exclusively” prepares her only for professions that state 
law will not let her practice.369 
A borrower seeking discharge of a student loan for false eligibility 
certification must present evidence corroborating the claim in her 
applications.370 Potential sources of evidence include Freedom of 
Information Act aimed at the Department of Education’s investigative 
reports, records from the school and (if applicable) the testing company, 
testimony of current or former school officials who knew of or participated 
in the fraud, and testimony or applications for false certification discharge 
from other borrowers that attended the school. 
When a school, without authorization, signs a student’s name to a loan 
application or promissory note, the student is entitled to discharge of the 
entire amount of the unauthorized loan.371 Additionally, when a school 
endorses a student loan check in the borrower’s name or authorizes on the 
borrower’s behalf an electronic transfer of student loan funds, the student 
may be entitled to discharge the amount of the check or transfer.372 To 
apply for a discharge of an unauthorized loan or payment, the borrower 
must state that she did not sign or authorize the transaction and provide five 
authentic signature specimens, including two specimens dating from within 
one year of the contested signature.373 To qualify for an unauthorized 
payment discharge, the borrower must state that she neither actually 
                                                                                                     
 367. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.215(a)(1)(iii), 682.402(e)(13)(iii)(FFEL). 
 368. Id. 
 369. See Johnson v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 580 F. Supp. 2d 154, 157–58 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(affirming Secretary’s denial of discharge to borrower for loans taken out for college’s 
paralegal studies program, because although borrower’s criminal record precluded him from 
employment as a paralegal, the program provided him with skills applicable to other jobs). 
 370. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, GEN-95-42 (Sept. 1995), 
available at http://www.ifap.ed.gov/dpcletters/doc0340_bodyoftext.htm; see also Gill v. 
Paige, 226 F. Supp. 2d 366, 373–74 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (upholding the Department’s policies 
regarding burdens of proof). 
 371. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.215(a)(1)(ii), (b)(1), 682.402(e)(1)(i)(B), (e)(2)(i). 
 372. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.215(a)(1)(iii), (b)(2), 682.402(e)(1)(i)(C), (e)(2)(v). 
 373. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.215(c)(2)(i)–(ii), (c)(3)(i)–(ii), 682.402(e)(4)(iii)(A), (B), 
(e)(4)(iv)(A), (B). 
COLLECTION OF STUDENT LOANS 267 
received the funds disbursed nor had the disbursement applied as a credit to 
charges she owed to the school.374 
Discharge for identity theft may be available for Direct loans as well 
as FFEL loans received on or after July 1, 2006.375 The criteria for identity 
theft discharge are onerous. To be eligible for an identity theft discharge, a 
borrower must certify that the borrower did not sign the promissory note or 
authorize the use of her identification in any way to obtain the loan and that 
she did not receive or benefit from the proceeds of the loan knowing that it 
had been obtained without her authorization.376 The borrower must also 
supply “a copy of a local, [s]tate or [f]ederal court verdict or judgment . . . 
conclusively determin[ing]” that she was the victim of identity theft by a 
perpetrator named in that judgment or verdict. If that judgment or verdict 
does not “expressly state that the loan was obtained as a result of the 
crime,” the borrower must also provide authentic signature specimens or 
other means of identification corresponding to the type of identification 
used to obtain the loan moved fraudulently and a statement of facts that 
demonstrate that eligibility was falsely certified as a result of the identity 
theft.377 
To obtain discharge under any of the false certification provisions, the 
borrower must submit a sworn statement to the holder of the loan asserting 
facts necessary to qualify for discharge.378 The borrower must also state 
whether she has made a claim against any third party relating to the false 
certification,379 assign pertinent causes of action to the Secretary or the 
Secretary’s designee, and promise to cooperate with any investigative and 
enforcement efforts.380 Initial decision-making authority rests with the 
Department for any loans it holds, and with the guaranty agency for FFEL 
loans that have not yet been assigned to the Secretary.381 For decisions 
made by the guaranty agency, the borrower is entitled to request review by 
                                                                                                     
 374. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.215(c)(3)(iii), 682.402(e)(4)(iv)(C). 
 375. 20 U.S.C. § 1087(c)(1); 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.215(a)(1)(iv),682.402(e)(1). 
 376. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.215(c)(4)(i), (ii), 682.402(e)(4)(v)(i), (ii). 
 377. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.215(c)(4)(iii), (iv), 682.402(e)(4)(v)(iii), (iv). 
 378. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.215(c), 682.402(e)(3). 
 379. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.215(c)(5), 682.402(e)(3)(i). 
 380. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.215(c)(6), 682.402(e)(3)(vi), (vii). 
 381. Procedures for false certification discharge are detailed at 34 C.F.R. § 685.215(d) 
for Direct loans and 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(e)(6)–(11). 
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the Secretary.382 Review of the Secretary’s decision is available under the 
APA. 
Unpaid Refunds. A student who takes out a FFEL or Direct loan 
toward a program but completes less than 60 percent of the program for 
which that loan is designated is eligible for a refund from the school.383 The 
amount of the refund depends on the date the student leaves the school.384 If 
the amount of the unpaid refund exceeds the remaining balance of the loan, 
the student is entitled to be reimbursed for the excess.385 
To receive an unpaid-refund discharge, the student must submit an 
application to the holder of the loan or a guaranty agency if the loan was 
made under the FFEL program.386 The application must include a sworn 
statement declaring that the borrower meets each of the criterion for 
eligibility; additionally, the borrower must state whether any other 
applications for discharge of the loan are pending, transfer any claims 
against third parties to the Secretary, or the Secretary’s designee, and 
promise to comply with the cooperation requirement.387 The borrower is not 
entitled to discharge if she is still attending the school; she and the 
Secretary, for a Direct loan, or the guaranty agency, for a FFEL loan, must 
attempt to resolve the unpaid refund for 120 days before she becomes 
eligible for discharge.388  
2. Discharges for Death and Disability 
The Secretary, guaranty agency, or educational institution will 
discharge a loan upon receiving an original or certified copy of a death 
certificate of either the borrower or in the case of a parent PLUS loan, the 
student.389  
                                                                                                     
 382. 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(e)(11). 
 383. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.216, 682.402(l)–(o). 
 384. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.216(d); 682.402(o)(2). 
 385. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.216(b); 682.402(l)(3). 
 386. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.216(c); 682.402(l)(4). 
 387. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.216(c); 682.402(l)(4)(ii). 
 388. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.216(a)(2); 682.402(l)(2). 
 389. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087(a)(1) (FFEL), 1087dd(c)(1)(F)(i) (Perkins); 34 C.F.R. 
§§ 685.212(a) (Direct), 682.402(b)  (FFEL), 674.61(a) (Perkins). Loans may be discharged 
based on other reliable evidence of death in extraordinary circumstances. 34 C.F.R. 
§§ 685.212(a)(2) (Direct), 682.402(b) (FFEL), 674.61(a) (Perkins). 
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Student loans may also be discharged if the borrower becomes totally 
and permanently disabled, as defined by the Secretary.390 A borrower 
seeking a disability discharge must submit an application to the lender, for a 
FFEL loan, or to the Secretary, for a Direct or Perkins loan.391 The 
application must include a certification by a physician that the borrower is 
totally and permanently disabled and must be submitted within 90 days of 
the physician’s certification.392 In lieu of such a certification, Direct and 
Perkins borrowers may submit a notice of award of Social Security 
disability benefits from the Social Security Administration indicating that 
the borrower's next scheduled disability review will be within five to seven 
years.393 
Once a borrower has notified the Secretary or the loan holder that she 
intends to seek a disability discharge, collection activity must be suspended 
for up to 120 days pending receipt of her application.394 After the borrower 
has submitted an application, collection activities must be suspended until 
the Secretary or loan holder reaches its decision.395 
If a FFEL loan is held by a guaranty agency or lender, and the loan 
holder approves the discharge application, the loan must be assigned to the 
Secretary.396 A guaranty agency or lender may, consistent with Department 
guidance, request additional evidence, and even seek review by an 
independent physician in making the determination.397  
If the agency or lender does determine that the student is permanently 
and totally disabled, the Secretary makes an independent, or, for Direct or 
Perkins loans, initial, determination of her eligibility.398 If the Secretary 
                                                                                                     
 390. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087(a)(1) (FFEL), 1087dd(c)(1)(F)(ii) (Perkins); 34 C.F.R. 
§§ 685.213(b) (Direct), 682.402(c) (FFEL), 674.61(b) (Perkins). “Totally and permanently 
disabled” is defined at 34 C.F.R. § 682.200. 
 391. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.213(b)(1), 682.402(c)(2), 674.61(b)(2)(iv). 
 392. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.213(b)(2)(i), (b)(3), 682.402(c)(2), 674.61(b)(2)(iv)(A), 
(b)(2)(v). A streamlined application process, requiring only documentation from the 
Department of Veterans Affairs, is available to veterans. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.213(c), 
682.402(c)(9), 674.61(c). 
 393. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.213(b)(2)(ii), 674.61(b)(2)(iv)(B). 
 394. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.213(b)(1)(ii); 674.61(b)(2)(ii)(D). 
 395. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.213(b)(3)(ii); 682.402(c)(7), 674.61(b)(2)(ix)(B). 
 396. 34 C.F.R. §§ 682.402(c)(2). 
 397. See U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., New Total and Permanent Disability Discharge 
Procedures for Title IV Loans – Effective July 1, 2002 (May 2002), available at 
http://ifap.ed.gov/dpcletters/GEN0203.html. 
 398. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.213(b)(4), 682.402(c)(3), 674.61(b)(3). 
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determines that the borrower is permanently and totally disabled, the 
Secretary discharges the loan; otherwise, the loan is due and payable to the 
Secretary under the terms of the promissory note.399 If the borrower’s 
application is insufficient to prove disability, the Secretary may require her 
to submit additional evidence or arrange for additional review of her 
condition by an independent physician at the government’s expense.400 
The borrower must return any loan disbursements made between the 
date the physician certifies her disability and the date of her discharge. Her 
discharge request will not be processed until she does so.401 A borrower 
who has received a disability discharge must notify the Secretary of any 
change of address and of her annual earnings from employment, if the 
Secretary requests the information or if those earnings are great enough to 
trigger reinstatement.402 A loan discharged for permanent and total 
disability may be reinstated if she has earnings above 100% of the poverty 
guideline for a family of two, receives a new TEACH grant or federal 
student loan, except for a consolidation loan including loans that were not 
discharged, fails to return loan disbursements received after the date of 
disability but before the date of discharge, or receives a notice from the 
Social Security Administration indicating that she is no longer disabled or 
that her continuing disability review will no longer be the five- to seven-
year period indicated in the notice of award of disability benefits.403  The 
Secretary must provide the borrower with notice of the reinstatement and an 
explanation of reasons and when she must begin repayment.404 
If the agency or lender does not approve the discharge application, it 
must notify the borrower, and it may resume collection activity.405 
 
                                                                                                     
 399. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.213(b)(4)(iii)–(iv), 682.402(c)(3), 674.61(b)(3)(v)–(vi). A 
Perkins loan that is discharged must be assigned to the Secretary. 34 C.F.R. 
§ 674.61(b)(3)(iv). 
 400. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.213(b)(4)(ii), 682.402(c)(3)(ii), 674.61(b)(3)(ii). 
 401. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.213(b)(5) (Direct), 682.402(c)(4) (FFEL), 674.61(b)(4) 
(Perkins). 
 402. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.213(b)(8) (Direct), 682.402(c)(7) (FFEL), 674.61(b)(7) 
(Perkins). 
 403. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.213(b)(7)(i) (Direct), 682.402(c)(6)(i) (FFEL), 674.61(b)(6)(i) 
(Perkins). 
 404. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.213(b)(7)(iii) (Direct), 682.402(c)(6)(iii) (FFEL), 
674.61(b)(6)(iii) (Perkins). 
 405. 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(c)(7)(iii), (v). 
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B. Discharge of Student Loans in Bankruptcy 
Most insolvent debtors may find a refuge in the Bankruptcy Court 
where they may cast their debts off and end creditors’ collection techniques. 
This refuge is unavailable to many student-loan borrowers.  
“The principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a ‘fresh 
start’ to the ‘honest but unfortunate debtor.’”406 To accomplish this purpose, 
the Code allows a debtor to discharge most unpaid debts, if the conditions 
for discharge are met.407  
Some debts, however, may not be discharged. Bankruptcy Code 
Section 523 lists the exceptions to the general rule.408 The student loan 
exception provides that, “[u]nless excepting such debt from discharge . . . 
would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s 
dependents,” discharge is not available for: 
“(A)(i) An educational benefit overpayment or loan made, 
insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any 
program  funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or 
nonprofit institution; or 
(ii) an obligation to repay funds received as an educational 
benefit, scholarship, or stipend; or 
(B) any other educational loan that is a qualified education loan, 
as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986, incurred by a debtor who was an individual.”409 
The creditor bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence 
to demonstrate that its debt falls into one of these three categories.410 In 
order to obtain “undue hardship” discharge of a loan falling under the 
exception, the debtor must bring an adversary proceeding against the 
creditor in question.411 The burden of proving undue hardship falls on the 
debtor.412 
                                                                                                     
 406. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (quoting 
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991)). 
 407. 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1328; Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367. 
 408. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). 
 409. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 
 410. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991) (holding that the creditor bears the burden 
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that an exception to dischargability applies). 
 411. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1373 (2010). Prior to 
Espinosa, some Chapter 13 debtors attempted to obtain discharge of student loans by filing a 
plan listing student loan debts among those that will be discharged once the debtor makes 
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Section 523(a)(8) presents two key issues that debtors, creditors, and 
courts must address: First, what is the scope of the exception, that is, what 
debts does it exclude from discharge absent undue hardship? Second, what 
constitutes “undue hardship” that will allow discharge of a debt covered by 
the section’s literal terms? This section addresses those questions in turn. 
1. The Scope of the Discharge Exception 
Subsection (A)(i) excludes all federal student loans, as all of these are 
made, Direct, or guaranteed or insured, FFEL, by the federal government, 
or made under a program funded in part by the federal government, Perkins 
and its predecessors. It also excludes loans made, insured, or funded by 
state or local governments; loans funded by nonprofits; and overpayments 
of educational benefits.413 The weight of authority has applied subsection 
(A) to bar discharge of debts held by non-student student-loan debtors like 
parents’ PLUS loans).414  
What is now subsection (A)(ii) was added to section 523(a)(8) as part 
of the Crime Control Act of 1990,415 and was designed to extend the 
exception’s coverage “to debts which are similar in nature to student 
loans.”416 The prototypical situation covered in subsection (A)(ii)—which 
excludes “obligations to repay funds received as an educational benefit, 
scholarship, or stipend”—involves a student who accepted a scholarship or 
stipend requiring her agreement to perform certain service following 
graduation, and subsequently failed to perform that service.417 Some courts 
have construed this provision more broadly to apply to actual loans.418 That 
                                                                                                     
the required payments under the plan. See, e.g., In re Banks, 299 F.3d 296, 301 (4th Cir. 
2002). In Espinosa, the Supreme Court held that if a student-loan creditor receives notice of 
such a plan and fails to object, the creditor is bound by it and the loans are discharged. 130 
S. Ct. at 1372. However, the Court openly criticized the tactic, which it characterized as a 
“bad-faith attempt to discharge student loan debt without the undue hardship finding 
Congress required,” and endorsed imposition of sanctions against debtors and attorneys who 
would employ it in the future. Id. at 1382.  
 412. In re Frushour, 433 F.3d 393, 400 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 413. See, e.g., In re Merchant, 958 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1992). 
 414. See, e.g., In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1993); In re Wilcon, 143 B.R. 4 
(D. Mass. 1992). 
 415. See Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 3621 (1990). 
 416. 136 CONG. REC. H13288-02, H13289 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. 
Brooks), 1990 WL 168500. 
 417. See, e.g., In re Burks, 244 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 418. See, e.g., In re Carow, 2011 WL 802847 (Bankr. D.N.D. Mar. 2, 2011); In re 
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is a dubious reading, to say the least; it would render the subsequently-
enacted subsection (B) irrelevant and leave subsection (A)(i) with nothing 
to do beyond forbidding discharges of debts arising from benefit 
overpayments (if (A)(ii) doesn’t cover that, too). In any event, this 
provision should not apply unless the student actually received monetary 
payments from the creditor.419 If the creditor simply provided educational 
services to the obligor in exchange for the student’s promise to perform 
certain services after graduation, it will not fall under subsection (A)(ii). 
Subsection (B) was added in 2005 as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act,420 and exempts “qualified 
educational loans,” as defined by section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue 
Code, from discharge. In short, if interest payments on the loan qualify for a 
tax deduction, the loan cannot be discharged. To constitute a qualified 
educational loan, the “indebtedness [must be] incurred by the taxpayer 
solely to pay qualified higher educational expenses.”421 “Qualified 
educational expenses” is based on the cost of attendance, as defined by a 
provision in the old version of the Higher Education Act.422 
                                                                                                     
Skipworth, 2010 WL 1417964 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Apr. 1, 2010) (holding bank loan borrowed 
to pay for bar review course is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii)).  
 419. See, e.g., In Re Rezendes, 318 B.R. 436, 444–45 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2004); In Re 
Ray, 262 B.R. 544, 551 (Bankr. N.D. Okla 2001); but see, In re Udell, 454 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 
2006) (holding that Air Force Academy graduate who failed to perform active duty service 
obligation could not discharge obligation to reimburse the government for costs of his 
education except upon a showing of undue hardship); In re Mehlman, 268 B.R. 379 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2001) (suggesting that this provision applies to tuition payments made by New 
York City Board of Education to NYU on behalf of student who agreed to perform service 
obligations upon graduation).  
 420. Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 220, 119 Stat. 23, 59 (2005). 
 421. 26 U.S.C. § 221(d)(1). The expenses in question must also be incurred on behalf of 
the taxpayer, her spouse, or a person who was a dependent of the taxpayer when the debt 
was incurred; be paid or incurred within a reasonable period of time after the indebtedness is 
incurred; and be “attributable to education furnished” while the recipient was an eligible 
student. Id. 
 422. 26 U.S.C. § 221(d)(2) reads in full:  
“The term “qualified higher education expenses” means the cost of attendance 
(as defined in section 472 of the Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. 
1087ll, as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of the Taxpayer 
Relief Act of 1997) at an eligible educational institution, reduced by the sum 
of— 
(A) the amount excluded from gross income under section 127, 135, 529, or 530 
by reason of such expenses, and 
(B) the amount of any scholarship, allowance, or payment described in section 
25A (g)(2). 
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Subsection B expanded the educational debt exception to discharge to 
include most private educational loans. But a private loan may be 
dischargeable in some circumstances. First, a “mixed-use” private loan, that 
is, a loan not solely incurred for qualified educational expenses, is 
dischargeable.423 Second, the educational institution must have met 
eligibility requirements for participation in Title IV assistance programs.424 
Thus, a loan to attend an unaccredited school should be fully dischargeable. 
Third, the student must have been enrolled in a program leading to a 
recognized educational credential at an eligible institution of higher 
education, a course of study necessary for enrollment in such a program, or 
in a program necessary for a professional teaching credential or certification 
required by state law for employment as a teacher.425 The student must also 
have carried “at least half the normal full-time work load for the course of 
study the student” pursued”426 and may not have been enrolled in a primary 
or secondary school at the time.427 Fourth, a loan the borrower incurred to 
pay the educational expenses of another person who is neither a spouse nor 
a dependent as defined by the tax code should be dischargeable.428 Fifth, 
debtors have successfully argued that loans taken out when the borrower 
                                                                                                     
For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term “eligible educational 
institution” has the same meaning given such term by section 25A (f)(2), except 
that such term shall also include an institution conducting an internship or 
residency program leading to a degree or certificate awarded by an institution of 
higher education, a hospital, or a health care facility which offers postgraduate 
training. 
 423. 26 C.F.R. § 1.221-1(e)(4) ex. 6 (stating that a private loan that is, in part, for 
residential improvements and, in part, for educational expenses does not qualify as an 
education loan).  
 424. 26 U.S.C. § 221(d)(2) (“eligible educational institution” is as defined in 26 U.S.C. 
§ 25A(f)(2), but also includes postgraduate internship and residency programs leading to 
degree or certificate offered by an institution of higher education, hospital, or health care 
facility that offers postgraduate training); 26 U.S.C. § 25A(f)(2) (“eligible educational 
institution” means an institution described in 20 U.S.C. § 1088 as in effect in 1997 and that 
is eligible to participate in title IV). 20 U.S.C. § 1088 (1997) (amended 1998). 
 425. 26 U.S.C. § 221(d)(3) (“The term ‘eligible student’ has the meaning given such 
term by section 25A (b)(3).”); 26 U.S.C. § 25A(b)(3)(A) (defining an eligible student as one 
who meets the criteria of 20 U.S.C. § 1091(a)(1), as in effect in 1997); 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1091(a)(1) (1997) (amended 1998). 
 426. 26 U.S.C. § 25A(b)(3)(B). 
 427. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(a)(1) (1997) (amended 1998) (providing that a student must “be 
enrolled or accepted for enrollment” in a postsecondary institution to receive financial 
assistance).  
 428. 26 U.S.C. § 221(d)(1)(A), (d)(4).  
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was not “a taxpayer” fall outside the plain language of section 221 of the 
Internal Revenue Code and thus outside the scope of the exception.429 
Finally, some courts have held that loans for business, rather than 
educational, purposes fall outside the scope of the exception.430 
Courts have addressed the question of what constitutes a “loan” for the 
purposes of subsections (A)(i) and (B). The Second Circuit in In re 
Renshaw defined a loan as “(i) a contract, whereby (ii) one party transfers a 
defined quantity of money, goods, or services to another, and (iii) the other 
party agrees to pay for the sum or items transferred at a later date.”431 The 
agreement must be reached prior to or contemporaneous with the 
transfer.432 The Third, Seventh, and Ninth circuits have expressly adopted 
the Renshaw approach.433 Other courts take an arguably broader approach, 
looking to the intent of the parties and to the “substance of the 
transaction.”434 Some courts have not expressly required a prior or 
contemporaneous agreement to repay.435 
Whatever approach a court claims to take, an extension of credit from 
an institution to a student pursuant to a prior or contemporaneous 
agreement will usually be found to constitute a “loan” within the meaning 
of the discharge exception.436 By contrast, a debt arising from a student’s 
                                                                                                     
 429. See In re LeBlanc, 404 B.R. 793 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2009) (finding that a 
nonresident alien who did not file a tax return while at school was not a “taxpayer” and was 
entitled to discharge of private student loan). 
 430. See, e.g., In re Hawkins, 317 B.R. 104 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004); In re McFadyan, 
192 B.R. 328 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 431. In re Renshaw, 222 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing In re Grand Union Co., 219 
F. 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1914)). 
 432. Id. 
 433. In re Chambers, 348 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Mehta, 310 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 
2002); In re Hawkins, 317 B.R. 104 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2004), aff’d and adopted 469 F.3d 1316 
(9th Cir. 2006). Bankruptcy courts that have examined Renshaw have also found it 
persuasive. See, e.g. In re Moore, 407 B.R. 855 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009); In re Gakinya, 364 
B.R. 366 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2007); see also In Re Johnson, 222 B.R. 783 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
1998) (adopting the test from In Re Grand Union Co., 219 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1914), which 
Renshaw also relied on). 
 434. In re DePasquale, 225 B.R. 830 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 1998); In re Johnson, 218 B.R. 
449 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 1998). 
 435. See, e.g., In re Merchant, 958 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that an extension 
of credit amounts to a loan when “(1) the student was aware of the credit extension and 
acknowledges the money owed; (2) the amount owed was liquidated; and (3) the extended 
credit was defined as ‘a sum of money due to a person.’” (citing In re Hill, 44 B.R. 645 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1984))). 
 436. See, e.g., McKay v. Ingleson, 558 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2009); In re Renshaw, 222 
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failure to pay tuition and fee bills typically does not constitute a loan.437 
Finally, scholarships and other educational benefits conferred on the 
condition that the student perform some obligation after graduation may 
also be considered loans, if the terms of the agreement provide for their 
treatment as such should the student default.438 
2. “Undue Hardship” 
Whichever paragraph of section 523(a)(8) exempts a student loan from 
discharge, the debtor may still be entitled to discharge the loan if repayment 
would “impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s 
dependents.”439 Nine circuits, including the Fourth Circuit,440 apply the 
narrow three-prong test established in Brunner v. New York State Higher 
Education Services Corporation.441 To satisfy the Brunner test, the debtor 
must “show that (1) she cannot maintain a minimal standard of living and 
repay the loans, (2) additional circumstances demonstrate that she will not 
be able to repay the loans for a substantial part of the repayment period, and 
(3) she attempted to repay the loans in good faith.”442 The debtor must 
establish all three prongs by a preponderance of the evidence.443 Through 
hundreds of cases, courts have attempted to sharpen each prong of the 
Brunner test. This section cites only a sampling of those cases. 
As the large number of reported decisions suggests, the Brunner 
inquiry is fact-intensive.444 Although the Brunner test has a reputation for 
                                                                                                     
F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000); In re Merchant, 958 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1992); but see In re Coole, 
202 B.R. 518 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1996) (no “loan” unless money changes hands). 
 437. See, e.g., In re Mehta, 262 B.R. 35 (D.N.J. 2001); In re Feyes, 228 B.R. 887 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1998). 
 438. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs v. Smith, 807 F.2d 122 (8th Cir. 
1986); In re Mehlman, 268 B.R. 379 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 439. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 
 440. In re Frushour, 443 F.3d 393 (4th Cir. 2005); see also In Re Oyler, 397 F.3d 382 
(6th Cir. 2005); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302 (10th Cir. 2004); In re 
Gerhardt, 348 F.3d 89 (5th Cir. 2003); In re Cox, 338 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2003); Goulet v. 
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 284 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 3003); In re Brightful, 267 F.3d 324 (3d 
Cir. 2001); In re Rifinio, 245 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2001); Matter of Robertson, 999 F.2d 1132 
(7th Cir. 1993); but see In re Long, 332 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2003) (applying a “totality of the 
circumstances” test); In re Bronsdon, 435 B.R. 791 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2010). 
 441. 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 442. In re Frushour, 443 F.3d at 398 (citing Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396). 
 443. Frushour, 443 F.3d at 400. 
 444. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Buchanan, 276 B.R. 744, 752 (N.D.W. Va. 2002); In 
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being harsh on debtors, many debtors have nevertheless discharged some or 
all of their student loans.445 Unfortunately, many borrowers do not even file 
an adversary proceeding to discharge their student loans in bankruptcy.446 
The world of undue hardship litigation is one of uncertainty more than 
futility.447 In this world, the skilled and experienced litigator can make a 
noticeable difference for her client.448  
Three Fourth Circuit cases examine the Brunner test in Chapter 7 
bankruptcy: In re Frushour, In re Mosko, and In re Spence. All three of 
these decisions rejected the debtor’s attempt to discharge the debt. Spence, 
the most recent case, is illustrative of the tough sledding that faces student 
loan debtors seeking to discharge those debts. There, the Fourth Circuit 
held that the debtor—a woman in her late sixties with $160,000 of student 
loan debt who could not find a job paying more than her $26,000 annual 
salary—was not entitled to an undue hardship discharge.449 The elderly Ms. 
Spence, the court reasoned, failed to meet prong two, because she had not 
shown an inability to obtain a higher paying job.450  She had also failed to 
                                                                                                     
re Bedra, 405 B.R. 461, 463 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008); see also Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle 
R. Lacey, The Real Student-loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 179, 190–91, 210 (2009) (suggesting that the high number of adjudicated 
proceedings in undue hardship cases is a product of doctrinal uncertainty). 
 445. Cf. Jason Iuliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student Loan Discharges and the 
Undue Hardship Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495, 507 (2013) (finding that twenty-five 
percent of debtors who sought student loan discharge in 2007 were granted full discharge, 
and another fourteen were granted partial discharge); Pardo & Lacey, supra note 444, at 
212–13 (finding that more than half of 115 debtors who sought discharge of student loans in 
five-year period in the Western District of Washington had some or all of their student loans 
discharged). 
 446. Iuliano, supra note 445, at 523 (observing that “99.9 percent of bankrupt student 
loan debtors do not even try to discharge their student loans”). 
 447. Pardo & Lacey, supra note 444, at 190–91, 210 (suggesting that high number of 
adjudicated proceedings in undue hardship cases is a product of doctrinal uncertainty); but 
see Iuliano, supra note 445, at 522 (finding that a borrower’s medical hardship, employment 
status, and prior year income are useful predictors of whether borrower will succeed in 
discharging student loans).  
 448. Pardo & Lacey, supra note 444, at 219–21 (finding that experience level and 
identity of debtor’s attorney to be statistically significant predictors of the percentage of the 
borrower’s student loan debt discharged in bankruptcy); but see Iuliano, supra note 445, at 
521–22 (finding no correlation between whether a borrower had an attorney and discharge of 
student loans). Accord Kevin J. Smith, Should the "Undue Hardship" Standard for 
Discharging Student or Educational Loans Be Expanded?, 18 BARRY L. REV. 333, 340 
(2013) (arguing that discharge is underused).  
 449. Spence, 541 F.3d at 542–43. 
 450. Id. at 544. 
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make a good faith effort to repay her loans, because she stopped actively 
seeking a higher-paying job and because she did not consider loan 
consolidation or reduced payment plans.451 
Substantively, the first prong of the Brunner test should be the easiest 
for the debtor to meet. Debtors are not required to live a life of asceticism 
and destitution.452 The line, rather, “lies somewhere between poverty and 
mere difficulty.”453 Thus, debtors living above the poverty line may satisfy 
the first prong.454 
Debtors may face three significant hurdles in establishing this prong. 
First, a debtor whose monthly income exceeds her monthly expenditures 
may have trouble establishing this prong. Indeed, one court has suggested 
that the debtor usually must show expenses in excess of income to satisfy 
this prong.455 A debtor must strike the right balance: cut your expenses 
enough to be able to claim that your standard of living is “minimal,” but not 
too much that the court deems only a partial discharge necessary, or worse, 
refuses any discharge at all.  
Second, a creditor may challenge a debtor’s expenses as unnecessary 
to meet a minimum standard of living. A “minimal standard of living” 
should include at least (1) clean shelter with climate-regulated heating and 
cooling, (2) basic utilities, including telephone, (3) food and personal 
hygiene products, (4) means of transportation, (5) life insurance and health 
insurance, or at least the ability to pay medical and dental expenses, and (6) 
“modest recreation.”456  
                                                                                                     
 451. Id. at 545. 
 452. See In re McLaney, 314 B.R. 228, 233 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2004) (“[The] minimal 
standard of living … standard does not condemn the debtors to a life of abject poverty.”); In 
re Bene, 474 B.R. 56 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 453. McLaney, 314 B.R. at 234. 
 454. In re Alston, 297 B.R. 410, 415 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2003) (“It is well established that 
maintaining a minimal standard of living does not mean that the debtor has to live at a 
poverty level to repay her student loan.”). While living at or below the poverty line itself 
may not guarantee that the debtor satisfies prong one, it is the rare debtor who is found not to 
qualify for undue hardship because of present sub-poverty income. But see In re Claxton, 
140 B.R. 565 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1992). 
 455. In re Velarde, 2009 WL 2614688 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009) (holding that debtor 
who, by “cutting [expenses] to the bone,” managed to eke out a monthly surplus did not 
satisfy Brunner prong one); but see In re Wallace, 443 B.R. 781 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010) 
(finding that debtor’s whose estimates of monthly income that exceeded expenses satisfied 
prong one with respect to monthly loan payments in excess of $20 per month, where debtor 
omitted some necessities from the monthly budget presented to the court). 
 456. In re Crawley, 460 B.R. 421, 436 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011) (citing In re Ivory, 269 
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Decisions run the gamut of these items, some finding claimed 
expenditures reasonable and others finding them unreasonable. Creditors 
have challenged debtors’ claimed housing expenses,457 some arguing that 
the debtor should find housing in a less expensive neighborhood.458 When 
creditors challenge food expenses, courts usually find debtors’ claims 
reasonable,459 but not always,460 especially if unless the debtor dines out 
frequently.461 Additionally, almost all courts regard cell phone bills as 
reasonable, especially if the debtor does not use landline telephone.462 
                                                                                                     
B.R. 890, 899 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2001)). 
 457. Compare In re Wallace, 443 B.R. 781, 788 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010) (finding $300 
monthly rent paid to debtor’s father reasonable), and In re Paul, 337 B.R. 730 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 2006) (finding $1,000 rent reasonable for three-bedroom apartment occupied by 
debtor, her parents (who paid for utilities), her 16-year-old sister, and her three children), 
with In re Clark, 341 B.R. 238 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (finding $1,600 monthly rental of 
single family home for family of five excessive). 
 458. Compare In re Gharavi, 335 B.R. 492, 500 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006) (finding 
$1,400 monthly rent not unreasonable for debtor living with dependent; debtor “wants to live 
in a safe neighborhood”), with In re Chappelle, 328 B.R. 565, 573 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2005) 
(holding unreasonable debtor’s $807.50 monthly contribution toward rent for studio 
apartment in “high-rent district” she shared with her boyfriend). 
 459. See, e.g., In re Jorgensen, 479 B.R. 79, 87 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) (allowing $625 
per month for food based on debtor’s health problems); In re Wallace, 443 B.R. 781, 786 n.3 
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010) (suggesting that $200 per month on food is “clearly inadequate” to 
support a minimal standard of living and describing $300 as “more reasonable”); In re 
Rhodes, 418 B.R. 27, 35 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2009) (“[Debtor’s] weekly food budget, 
amounting to $53.48, is pitiful.”); In re McLaney, 375 B.R. 666, 674 (M.D. Ala. 2007) 
(declaring that a $348 monthly food budget amounts to “an almost impossible $1.30 per 
meal” for a family of three); In re Lebovitis, 223 B.R. 265, 272 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998) 
($1,600 monthly to feed family of nine not excessive). 
 460. See, e.g., In re Bott, 324 B.R. 771, 777 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2005) (finding $600 on 
food for debtor with two dependent children excessive and suggesting $400 as a reasonable 
figure); see also In re Clark, 341 B.R. 238, 250 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (finding $905 
monthly expenses for debtor, husband, and three children excessive).  
 461. See, e.g., In re Gibson, 428 B.R. 385, 390 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010) (“Eating out 
is a luxury, in the court’s view.”); Cockels v. Mae, 414 B.R. 149, 156 (E.D. Mich. 2009) 
(concluding that the Bankruptcy Court did not err when it found Debtor Cockels’ food 
expenses to be excessive and could be reduced by eating out less); see also Educ. Credit 
Mgmt. Corp. v. Young, 376 B.R. 795, 800 (E.D. Tenn. 2007) (finding $650 monthly food 
expenditure for debtor and 12-year-old son unreasonable given the debtor’s “penchant for 
eating out”); but see In re Wallace, 443 B.R. 781, 795 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010) (allowing 
discharge where debtor listed $100 monthly expenditure for “Food (eating out)”). 
 462. See, e.g., In re Nixon, 453 B.R. 311, 329 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2011) (finding $67 for 
cell phones and $68 for landline telephones reasonable); In re Brooks, 406 B.R. 382, 390 
(Bankr. D. Minn. 2009) (“A cellular telephone is not a luxury when it is a debtor’s only 
phone . . . .”); In re Pollard, 306 B.R. 637, 646 (Bankr. D. Minn., 2004) (stating that the use 
of a cellular phone is not a luxury); but see In re Mosko, 515 F.3d 319, 325 (4th Cir. 2008) 
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Courts also sensibly accommodate debtors’ responsible transportation 
expenses, including purchases of used automobiles.463 
Recreational and discretionary expenditures are a fertile source of 
litigation. While almost all courts agree that “people are not robots, and 
require at least minimal opportunity for recreation and relaxation,”464 they 
do not agree on what types or amounts of recreational expenses should be 
permitted.465 Debtors who can tie expenses typically regarded as 
recreational to a work-related purpose tend to fare well.466 Courts have 
typically regarded items like health club memberships467 and premium 
                                                                                                     
(finding monthly expenses of “$75 for internet, $80 for cell phones, $60 for satellite 
television, $68 for a YMCA membership, and an undisclosed amount for cigarettes” to be 
“generally unnecessary to maintain a minimal standard of living”). 
 463. See In re Marcotte, 455 B.R. 460, 472 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011) (finding $3,800 
purchase of used Jeep Wrangler reasonable); In re Williams, 301 B.R. 62, 73 (Bankr. N.D. 
Cal. 2003) (finding married debtors reasonably required two cars, as sometimes they were 
unable to commute to work together). Debtors who splurge on transportation tend to fare 
poorly. See, e.g., In re Armstrong, 394 B.R. 43, 54 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008) (finding purchase 
of 2004 Pontiac Montana for $36,000 excessive). 
 464. In re Woody, 494 F.3d 939, 951 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding $17 monthly for “Cable/
Satellite/Internet” and $95 for “Recreation/Entertainment” were reasonably necessary to 
minimal standard of living). 
 465. Compare In re Mosko, 515 F.3d 319, 325 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Such items [as 
internet, cell phones, satellite TV, and a YMCA membership] are generally unnecessary to 
maintain a minimum standard of living.”), and In re Bott, 324 B.R. 771, 777 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mo. 2005) (“Plaintiff should not be allowed to have such luxuries [as a $40 per month cable 
TV subscription] if she cannot afford to make payments to ECMC.”), with In re Frushour, 
433 F.3d 393, 400–01 (4th Cir. 2005) (“In short, the mere fact of Frushour’s Internet and 
cable expenses would not disqualify her from an undue hardship discharge.”); In re Nixon, 
453 B.R. 311, 329 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2011) (finding expenses of $126 internet, $67 for cell 
phones, and $68 for landline telephones reasonable, “because they permit the Plaintiffs to 
have a source of entertainment and allow Elisabeth to apply for employment online”); In re 
Innes, 284 B.R. 496, 505 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2002) (allowing discharge to debtors who used 
much of one year’s tax refund on “a single frugal summer vacation”). 
 466. See, e.g., In re Jorgensen, 2012 WL 171599, at *2 (Bankr. D. Haw. Jan. 20, 2012) 
(finding debtor’s $75 monthly cellular and $50 monthly high speed internet bills reasonable, 
because “[r]eady access to online data at all times, at work, at home, and while traveling, is 
indispensable to [her] work as a professor”). 
 467. See, e.g., In re Weldon, 2008 WL 4527654, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (stating that 
debtor could make significant monthly payments if she ceased health club payments and 
other expenditures); In re Kitterman, 349 B.R. 775, 778 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2006) (suggesting 
debtor’s health club membership was not a necessary expense); In re Pincus, 280 B.R. 303 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating a gym membership was not necessary when debtor’s 
employer provided a gym free of charge); but see In re Gerhardt, 276 B.R. 424, 429 (Bankr. 
E.D. La. 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 348 F.3d 89 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that the health 
club membership was necessary to help debtor alleviate back and arm pain). 
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cable television subscriptions468 as unnecessary. Courts are split on whether 
cigarette expenses may be counted toward a minimal standard of living, 
though Mosko suggests that they are not.469 Litigants have also disputed 
charitable expenditures,470 contributions to retirement accounts471 and life 
insurance policies,472 and expenses of dependent children.473  
                                                                                                     
 468. See, e.g., In re Russotto, 370 B.R. 853, 857 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (stating that 
Debtor’s $130 cable bill was not a reasonable expense); In re Pobiner, 309 B.R. 405, 417 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2004) (deeming “premium cable channels” a “luxur[y]”); but see In re 
Jones, 495 B.R. 674, 686–87 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013) (stating that a $293 per month for cable 
and phone bill not excessive). 
 469. See, e.g., In re Brooks, 406 B.R. 382, 386 (Bankr. D. Minn 2009) (deciding that 
cigarettes are an unreasonable luxury expense); In re Campton, 405 B.R. 887, 891 (Bankr. 
D. Ohio 2009) (“[C]igarettes are not expenditures normally necessary to maintain a 
minimum standard of living . . . .”); see also In re Mosko, 515 F.3d 319, 325 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(finding lack of good faith based on certain expenditures, including “an undisclosed amount 
for cigarettes,” that “are generally unnecessary to maintain a minimum standard of living”); 
but see In re Gharavi, 335 B.R. 492, 499–500 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006) (finding $175 monthly 
cigarette expense reasonable and cataloguing cases). 
 470. Compare Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Rhodes, 464 B.R. 918, 924 (W.D. Wash. 
2012) (“Without concluding that all religious or charitable contributions are per se 
unreasonable under § 523(a)(8), this Court grants far less deference to such voluntary 
contributions than to a debtor’s contract-based obligations to his creditors.”), In re Bush, 450 
B.R. 235, 244 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2011) (stating that a $320 monthly charitable contribution is 
excessive), and In re Simone, 375 B.R. 481, 504 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007) (stating that no 
discharge for debtor who made over $7,000 in charitable donations the previous year), with 
Cumberworth v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 2005 WL 1387981, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa June 7, 
2005) (noting that Debtor’s charitable spending is discretionary but not unreasonable). Most 
courts appear willing to treat tithes as reasonable in certain circumstances. See, e.g., In re 
Larson, 426 B.R. 782, 789–90 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010) (stating that a $80 monthly tithe is 
reasonable); In re McLaney, 375 B.R. 666, 681 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (stating that a $220 
monthly tithe is reasonable and there was no Congressional intent to label all tithes as 
unreasonable); In re Durrani, 311 B.R. 496, 503–04 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) (deciding that a 
$226 monthly tithe is a reasonable expense); see also In re Lebovitis, 223 B.R. 265, 273 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that the Religions Liberty and Charitable Donation 
Protection Act of 1997 requires treating tithes of up to 15% of gross income as reasonable); 
but see In re Fullbright, 319 B.R. 650, 652 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2005) (deciding a discharge 
was not appropriate and deeming a tithe of $430 per month discretionary), and In re Lynn, 
168 B.R. 693, 700 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994) (deciding a discharge was not appropriate  and 
stating the tithe was unreasonable because her church gave her the option of ceasing 
donations in certain circumstances). 
 471. See, e.g., In re Craig, 579 F.3d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he determination 
of whether retirement contributions are a ‘reasonably necessary’ expense is to be made using 
‘a case-by-case approach.’”). 
 472. See, e.g., In re Weldon, 2008 WL 4527654, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (criticizing 
expenditure on life insurance premium as excessive). 
 473. See In re Gill, 326 B.R. 611, 631–34 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005) (discussing different 
approaches courts have taken regarding expenditures on adult children). 
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Frugality in some areas may excuse borderline expenses in others,474 
so a wise debtor will call the court’s attention to the deepest cuts she has 
made in her budget. Finally, it should go without saying that debtors must 
actually incur or reasonably anticipate incurring the expenses they claim.475 
A thorny problem that has divided the courts is whether the 
availability of income-contingent repayment affects the debtor’s ability to 
satisfy this prong of the Brunner test. Some courts have held that a debtor 
who has enrolled in ICR or who may be eligible to enroll in it, and who 
owes or would owe monthly payments of $0 under the plan, is not entitled 
to discharge because the repayment obligation does not affect the debtor’s 
ability to maintain a minimal standard of living.476 One circuit judge has 
opined that all low-income student loan debtors should be required to enter 
ICRP rather than file for bankruptcy.477 Other courts, reasoning that a 
debtor with a zero repayment is not actually being “forced to repay the 
student loan,” have rejected this approach.478 Still other courts apply a 
totality of the circumstances approach, considering the availability of 
income dependent repayment plans alongside other relevant facts.479  
                                                                                                     
 474. See, e.g., In re Lewis, 276 B.R. 912, 917 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2002) (finding that 
debtor satisfied prong one despite car payment “at the high end of the range of reasonable” 
in light of her “otherwise frugal lifestyle and budget shortfalls”). 
 475. See, e.g., Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Jesperson, 571 F.3d 775, 780 (8th Cir. 
2009) (noting that the bankruptcy court erred in imputing $1,000 fair market rent to debtor 
whose brother allowed him to live at his apartment rent free); In re Clark, 341 B.R. 238, 251 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (noting that home maintenance expenditure of $260 per month for 
debtor who does not own home). 
 476. In re Greene, 484 B.R. 98, 104 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012); In re Geyer, 344 B.R. 129, 
132–33 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2006). 
 477. Krieger v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 713 F.3d 882, 885 (7th Cir., 2013) (Manion, 
J., concurring). 
 478. In re Durrani, 311 B.R. 496, 505 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) (“The question framed 
by Brunner in this first prong is whether Durrani can maintain a minimal standard of living 
if she is required to repay this loan, not whether she has any surplus in her budget available 
for a monthly payment.”); In re Coatney, 345 B.R. 905 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2006); In re Booth, 
410 B.R. 672 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2009); see also Terrence L. Michael & Janie M. Phelps, 
Judges?!—We Don’t Need No Stinking Judges!!!: The Discharge of Student Loans in 
Bankruptcy Cases and the Income Contingent Repayment Plan, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 73, 74 
(2005) (“Government agencies argue that, due to the existence of programs such as the 
ICRP, the nondischarge of a student loan can never constitute an undue hardship.”). 
 479. In re Bene, 474 B.R. 56, 60 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2012) (determining that the 
availability of the Ford Program is just one of a “‘totality of factors’ that the Court must 
apply in a § 523(a)(8) analysis”); see also Krieger v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 713 F.3d 
882, 884 (holding the debtors need not agree to a repayment plan as a matter of law, and 
adding that “[w]hat remains is a predominantly factual understanding”). 
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The second prong of the Brunner test—that “additional circumstances 
exist indicating that [the debtor’s] state of affairs is likely to persist for a 
significant portion of the repayment period”480—is probably the most 
difficult for Fourth Circuit debtors to meet. Frushour describes this prong 
as “the heart of the Brunner test” because it “reflects the congressional 
imperative that the debtor's hardship must be more than the normal hardship 
that accompanies any bankruptcy.”481 This “demanding requirement … 
necessitates that a certainty of hopelessness exists that the debtor will be 
able to repay the student loans,” and is satisfied only in “rare 
circumstances.”482 Such rare circumstances might include, but are not 
limited to, “‘illness, disability, a lack of useable job skills, or the existence 
of a large number of dependents.’”483 
In Frushour, the Fourth Circuit, over a vigorous dissent from Judge 
Hamilton, reversed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision discharging the student 
loan debt of a forty-something single mother who earned around $10,000 
per year.484 The debtor regularly worked from home, marketing her services 
as an interior designer and decorative painter, in order to avoid paying 
childcare costs for her seven-year-old son.485 The court discounted the 
debtor’s current situation, insisting that the inquiry under Brunner prong 
two is prospective.486 The debtor had worked in higher-paying jobs in the 
past, and could not show that she would be unable to obtain a higher paying 
job in the near future based on prior inability to obtain such a job, because 
she was not actively seeking higher-paying employment at the time.487 
“[G]iven her college education, real estate license, and restaurant 
management experience,” the court concluded that she had not shown a 
                                                                                                     
 480. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d, 395, 396 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
 481. In re Frushour, 433 F.3d 393, 401 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing In re Rifino, 245 F.3d 
1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 482. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted); but see In re Carnduff, 367 B.R. 
120, 128 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2007) (declining to adopt “certainty of hopelessness” standard, 
because debtor need only prove inability to repay in the future by preponderance of 
evidence). 
 483. Id. (quoting In re Oyler, 397 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2005)).  
 484. Id. Both the Pardo and Lacey and Iuliano studies found existence of a medical 
condition to be a statistically significant predictor of discharge. Pardo & Lacey, supra note 
444, at 216–18; Iuliano, supra note 445, at 509–10. 
 485. Frushour, 433 F.3d at 396–97. 
 486. Id. at 401. 
 487. Id. 
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likelihood “that her present circumstances will extend for the rest of her 
repayment period or that she will not be able to pay off her loans at some 
future date.”488 
Frushour raises the possibility that a debtor’s failure to maximize 
income may defeat her attempts to establish the second prong of the 
Brunner test, a position that courts in other circuits have taken in refusing to 
discharge debts of ministers,489 public defenders,490 and musicians.491 
Debtors in public service positions are well-advised to emphasize the 
importance of health and other benefits and to point out that such benefits 
may be unavailable in private, for-profit-sector jobs,492 and to add any other 
facts which might influence a reasonable person to avoid switching jobs, for 
example proximity to the debtor’s current residence. However, they should 
avoid sharing altruistic motives for working in public or private non-profit 
sectors. While her disposition toward service may win the debtor 
admiration from the judge,493 it may not earn her a discharge of her student 
loans.494 
Many claims of undue hardship involve debtors with one or more 
medical conditions. A debtor who bases a hardship claim on medical or 
mental-health conditions must tie her condition to her inability to obtain 
and maintain a particular level of employment, and must show that the 
condition will persist for a significant portion of the repayment period.495 
                                                                                                     
 488. In re Frushour, 433 F.3d 393, 401 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 489. See In re Oyler, 397 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The Bankruptcy Court erred 
by not considering that Oyler's decision not to maximize his earnings, though commendable, 
was voluntarily made after he also voluntarily incurred the debt that he now wishes to 
discharge.”). 
 490. See In re Bender, 338 B.R. 62 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006); In re Evans-Lambert, 
2008 WL 1734123 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2008). 
 491. See In re Gerhardt, 348 F.3d 89 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 492. See In re Avant, 2006 WL 3782168, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Dec. 21, 2006) 
(“[The Debtor] further testified that she cannot obtain insurance on her own or through 
another employer, so she is stuck at her current job, which offers little opportunity for 
advancement.”). 
 493. See Bender, 338 B.R. at 70 (“The Debtor testified that he enjoys her current 
position because it allows him to give something back to society. While that is a 
commendable sentiment, he also gives back by repaying her student loans.”). 
 494. See id. (denying an undue hardship discharge). 
 495. See In re Tirch, 409 F.3d 677, 681–682 (6th Cir. 2005) (explaining that because 
Tirch did not provide evidence that her problems would persist for a significant portion of 
the loan repayment period, she did not satisfy Brunner’s second prong); see also In re 
Mosley, 494 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he crucial requirement is that the debtor 
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The borrower need not produce a medical professional’s expert testimony 
to obtain an undue hardship discharge.496 Indeed, a debtor’s credible 
testimony alone should suffice when the creditor does not contest it.497 
Brunner’s “good faith” prong is also an imposing hurdle to debtors in 
the Fourth Circuit. “Good faith efforts” refers to the debtor’s “‘efforts to 
obtain employment, maximize income, and minimize expenses.’”498 It also 
requires that the debtor’s hardship be caused by factors beyond her 
control.499 Courts have noted overlap between the second and third prongs, 
in that both involve consideration, directly or indirectly, of whether the 
debtor has maximized her income.500 The expense-minimization inquiry 
also frequently overlaps with prong one’s analysis of whether a debtor’s 
present expenses are necessary to a minimum standard of living.  
Courts may have made the good-faith prong far stiffer than the 
Brunner court intended it to be. In Brunner, the debtor filed for bankruptcy 
seven months after leaving school and within a month of when her first 
payment came due.501 Construing the good-faith prerequisite to cover only 
the situation in which the debtor seeks to discharge her student loans as 
soon as she is obliged to repay them, without even the slightest effort 
toward repayment, better accounts for the state of the law that the Brunner 
court found. For then, student loans could be discharged like any other debt 
                                                                                                     
show how his medical conditions prevent him from working. . . .”);  In re Davis, 373 B.R. 
241 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (rejecting undue hardship claim based on debtor’s alleged depression 
where debtor admitted that her ailment “never caused her to lose a job or miss an interview 
or employment opportunity”);  In re Congdon, 365 B.R. 433 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2007) (“In this 
Court's view, the fatal gap in the Plaintiff's case was [her] failure to present any 
corroborating evidence that she has an impairment (or a cluster of impairments) that are 
likely to persist well into the future.”). 
 496. See In re Barrett, 487 F.3d 353 (6th Cir. 2007); In re Mason, 464 F.3d 878 (8th 
Cir. 2006) (noting testimony of debtor and his mother sufficient to establish existence of 
learning disability where creditor did not dispute its existence); but see In re Davis, 373 B.R. 
241 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting lack of corroboration of debtor’s testimony about her 
depression in rejecting undue hardship claim). 
 497. See, e.g., In re Alliger, 78 B.R. 96 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). 
 498. In re Mosko, 515 F.3d 319, 324 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting O’Hearn v. Educ. Credit 
Management Corp., 339 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2003)); accord Hedlund v. Educational 
Resources Institute, Inc., 718 F.3d 848, 852 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 499. See In re Frushour, 433 F.3d 393, 402 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 500. See In re Myers, 2010 WL 890444, at *4 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2010) (“This 
component of the third Brunner prong frequently overlaps with the analysis of the second 
prong, under which the court must determine whether the debtor’s state of affairs is likely to 
persist.”).  
 501. See In re Brunner, 46 B.R. 752, 758 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
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five years after becoming due.502 It would also parallel more closely the 
meaning of the term “good faith” in other legal contexts.503 But, at least in 
the Fourth Circuit, and at least for now, these arguments will find no 
quarter but in the rarefied setting of an en banc Court of Appeals. 
A debtor’s failure to make student loan payments while she is able will 
almost certainly prove fatal to her undue-hardship claim.504 In Mosko, for 
example, the court refused to allow an undue hardship discharge for a 
couple with a young son, because the debtors had made no payments during 
a year in which they had an adjusted gross income of over $64,000 and 
during which time their net monthly income exceeded reasonable expenses 
by $480.505 
Courts may find that failure to seek the best paying job possible 
defeats the debtor on this prong as well as the second. Courts have 
described the quantum of effort borrowers must satisfy as that of 
“strenuous”506 and “best efforts.”507 A debtor who desires discharge should 
extend her job search beyond her field of preference508 even beyond the 
field for which her education and training prepare her.509 A debtor’s failure 
                                                                                                     
 502. See id. at 753–56; see also id. at 755 (“The propriety of a requirement of good 
faith is further emphasized by the stated purpose for § 523(a)(8): to forestall students, who 
frequently have a large excess of liabilities over assets solely because of their student loans, 
from abusing the bankruptcy system to shed these loans.”). 
 503. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 & cmts. a–e (1981) (discussing 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the context of contract law). What courts have 
required to satisfy Brunner’s “good faith” prong is a level of performance that looks more 
like the duty of “best efforts” implied in exclusive contracts. Cf. U.C.C § 2-306 (2002). 
 504. See In re Mosko, 515 F.3d 319, 326 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he payments the Moskos 
made on their student loans are insufficient to demonstrate good faith because they failed to 
make payments on their student loans during a time period when their income substantially 
exceeded their necessary expenses.”);  see also In re Fields, 286 Fed. Appx. 246, 250 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (rejecting undue hardship claim because debtor’s failure to make payments did 
not result from factors beyond her control);  In re McNemar, 352 B.R. 621, 624 (Bankr. 
N.D. W. Va. 2006) (rejecting undue hardship claim because of debtor’s voluntary cessation 
of payments on loan). 
 505. See Mosko, 515 F.3d at 326. 
 506. In re Farrish, 272 B.R. 456, 462 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2001). 
 507. In re Flores, 282 B.R. 847, 854 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002). 
 508. In re Lohr, 252 B.R. 84, 88 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000) (“Good faith attempts to 
maximize income require the debtor to take advantage of opportunities for work when it has 
been available and diligently look for work, whether or not in the debtor’s chosen field, 
when it has not been available.”). 
 509. In re Pobiner, 309 B.R. 405, 421 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[Pobiner] not only 
failed to actively pursue jobs in the legal field other than as a licensed attorney, but also 
failed to actively pursue jobs in any other field.”). 
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to tap non-employment sources of income may also prevent her 
discharge.510 
All three Fourth Circuit cases emphasize that the debtor’s 
consideration, and perhaps even pursuit, of consolidation and reduced-
payment plans are a required part of good faith efforts.511 The court in 
Frushour explained that “[t]he debtor's effort to seek out loan consolidation 
options that make the debt less onerous is an important component of the 
good-faith inquiry” because “it illustrates that the debtor takes her loan 
obligations seriously, and is doing her utmost to repay them despite her 
unfortunate circumstances.”512  
The debtor can take some minor solace in lower courts’ rejection of a 
per se rule requiring a debtor to pursue alternative repayment plans.513 At 
least one other circuit has rejected requiring participation in an income-
contingent repayment plan as extra-textual and contrary to statutory 
purpose.514 Indeed, an income-based repayment plan that allows debt to pile 
                                                                                                     
 510. See, e.g. In re Thoms, 257 B.R. 144 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying undue 
hardship discharge where debtor failed to seek child support payments from her child’s 
father). 
 511. In re Spence, 541 F.3d 538, 545 (“Ms. Spence did not fully explore the possibility 
of loan consolidation programs that offer reduced payments based upon the debtor's limited 
income.”); In re Mosko, 515 F.3d 319, 326 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Finally, the Moskos failed to 
adequately pursue loan consolidation options.”); In re Frushour, 433 F.3d 393, 404 (4th Cir. 
2005) (“Frushour. . . refused to consider loan consolidation programs that would have 
required from her a monthly payment of near zero based on her current income.”). Lower 
courts in the Fourth Circuit have found that debtors who failed to pursue income contingent 
repayment plans also fell short of satisfying Brunner prong one, when the debtor could make 
payments required under such a plan while maintaining a minimal standard of living. See, 
e.g., In re Boston, 2011 WL 4712078 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Oct. 5, 2011); In re Straub, 435 
B.R. 312 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2010). 
 512. Frushour, 433 F.3d at 402.  
 513. See Hooker v. Educ. Credit Management Corp., 368 B.R. 502, 505 (W.D. Va. 
2007) (holding that debtor’s failure to investigate ICRP did not preclude finding of good 
faith and reversing Bankruptcy Court order denying undue hardship discharge); In re Brown, 
2007 WL 1747135, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. June 15, 2007) (“[T]he Debtor's failure to 
seek out loan repayment options is not solely dispositive. . . . Rather, it is only one 
component of a broader examination of a debtor's good faith efforts.”). 
 514. As the Sixth Circuit explained in one case: 
Congress recently enacted [the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005,] the most sweeping reform of bankruptcy law since the 
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. Yet Congress left § 523(a)(8)'s 
“undue hardship” language intact. Had Congress intended participation in the 
ICRP-implemented in 1994-to effectively repeal discharge under § 523(a)(8), it 
could have done so. In addition, requiring enrollment in the ICRP runs counter 
to the Bankruptcy Code's aim in providing debtors a ‘fresh start. 
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up while the debtor makes minimal payments seem contrary to the entire 
concept of bankruptcy. It is no answer that income-based repayment 
schemes provide for discharge of the debt at the end of a fixed period, 
which is twenty-five years for ICRPs. The cancelled debt is treated as 
taxable income and the borrower is essentially forced to “trad[e] one non-
dischargeable debt for another.”515 
Whether or not Frushour, Mosko, and Spence were correctly decided, 
they represent settled Fourth Circuit precedent. Thus a debtor in bankruptcy 
in the Fourth Circuit who has pursued repayment and consolidation 
strategies stands a significantly better chance of obtaining an undue 
hardship discharge.516 A borrower who has not should be prepared to offer a 
good reason for her failure.517 
VI. It Could be Worse 
Although we have developed the student borrower’s plight at length, 
we are aware that other debtors encounter serious collection techniques. To 
begin, some judgment creditors may exploit collection techniques against 
consumer debtors to create the equivalent of debt imprisonment.518 
A delinquent family-support debtor risks coercive contempt, 
potentially leading to confinement. In 2011, the United States Supreme 
Court approved allegedly indigent family-support debtors’ coercive 
contempt confinement without appointed lawyers.519 
                                                                                                     
In re Barrett, 487 F.3d 353, 364 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citations, quotations, and footnotes 
omitted); see also Hedlund v. Educ. Res. Inst., Inc., 718 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that partial discharge was not clearly erroneous, even though debtor failed to pursue ICRP); 
In re Roth, 490 B.R. 908, 920–21  (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that a debtor’s failure 
to pursue income-based repayment should not be counted against her, given her advanced 
age, poor health, and limited employment prospects). 
 515. In re Barrett, 487 F.3d 353, 364 (6th Cir. 2007); Schrag, supra note 123, at 415–16 
(2013). 
 516. See, e.g., In re Dykstra, 362 B.R. 221 (Bankr. D. Md. 2007). 
 517. Cf. In re Robinson, 416 B.R. 275 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009) (noting that the debtor in 
Chapter 13 case failed to show good faith in refusing to consider consolidation or repayment 
plans based only on her desire to avoid having debt reflected in her credit report, which she 
alleged would prevent her from obtaining affordable and stable rental housing). 
 518. Lea Shepard, Creditors' Contempt, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1509; Note, Body 
Attachment and Body Execution: Forgotten but Not Gone, 17 WILLIAM & MARY L.REV. 543 
(1976). 
 519. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507 (2011). 
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Dealing with a voluntarily unemployed child-support debtor, 
California’s highest court rejected arguments that contempt was 
imprisonment for a civil debt and involuntary servitude.520 Family support, 
the court said, is not a debt for purposes of the constitutional provision that 
forbids debt imprisonment.521 Nor may a debtor who can choose his 
employer claim involuntary servitude.522 In effect, the court told the 
voluntarily unemployed debtor, who according to the trial judge could “flip 
burgers,” to get a job or go to jail.523 The Brunner undue-hardship test to 
discharge student loans, in effect, embodies the “get-a-job” half of the Moss 
court’s ruling.524 Like a student borrower, a delinquent family-support 
debtor is subject to pre-judgment license suspension, offset, and 
garnishment.525 Nor may a child-support debtor discharge his obligation in 
bankruptcy.526 
Moreover, a health-professional who defaults on a National Health 
Service Corps loan may be charged with “liquidated” damages.527 There is 
no statute of limitations on the government's filing suit or collecting a 
judgment. The government may recover the amount loaned, plus the 
number of uncompleted months times $7500 and interest at the maximum 
legal rate.528 A borrower's bankruptcy discharge will be excruciatingly 
difficult; none at all for seven years from when repayment is required and 
then only if the bankruptcy court finds that not discharging the defendant's 
debt would be "unconscionable."529 
The reasons that family support and Health Services Corps loans are 
difficult to avoid don’t apply to student loans. A custodial parent may 
encounter brutal need. A non-custodial parent’s duty to support his child is 
a “fundamental parental obligation” based on “fundamental societal norms 
and fair dealing, and [a debtor who doesn’t pay] necessarily intentionally 
does an act which prejudices the rights of his children.”530 The Health 
                                                                                                     
 520. Moss v. Superior Court, 950 P.2d 59, 76 (Cal. 1998). 
 521. Id. 
 522. Id. at 72. 
 523. Id. at 63. 
 524. See supra notes 439–517 and accompanying text. 
 525. RENDLEMAN, EJL-V 3D, supra note 311. 
 526. 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(5),(15).  See also 42 U.S.C. § 656(b). 
 527. 42 U.S.C. § 254o(b)(1)(A). 
 528. 42 U.S.C. § 254o(c)(1). 
 529. 42 U.S.C. § 254o(d)(3)(a). 
 530. Moss, 950 P.2d at 76. 
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Services Corps sends doctors to medically underserved communities where 
the population’s health needs may be unmet. 
VII. Conclusion  
Above, we have been careful to articulate the student-loan collection 
scheme and to reduce our evaluation of the programs. We will turn to the 
latter in our closing remarks. 
Our first observation about collection of student loans is that 
complexity breeds confusion. Divided government and compromises have 
created almost geologic layers of programs. The programs duplicate and 
overlap when they aren’t apparently contradictory. The complexity spawns 
management that undermines efficiency and public trust.  
Confusion also hurts borrowers, who struggle to understand the 
complex student loan system. How else to explain why so many borrowers 
fall behind on payments and ultimately default when the consequences of 
default are so severe and the tools for avoiding delinquency and default 
(e.g. deferments, forbearance, income-dependent and extended repayment 
plans) are so many? Or why so few debtors in bankruptcy seek discharge of 
their student loans? Borrowers who don’t understand the system must make 
binding decisions often behind a veil of ignorance. 
We find it hard to know whether the whole system actually works or is 
dysfunctional. In addition to harboring four student-loan borrowers, the 
senior author chaired the AAUP Government Relations Committee for four 
years and served twice on the AALS Government Relations Committee. He 
teaches in law school classrooms, which he shares with well over a million 
dollars in student debt. The junior author is repaying his own student loans 
delete-of his own. Yet, even after this lengthy and technical project, we 
aren’t sure that we understand the whole system. 
Congress should view the educational finance system as a whole, the 
colleges’ and states’ contributions, students’ and parents’ contributions, 
loans and grants. It should consolidate and rebalance grant and loan 
programs with similar missions. Consolidation should reduce the 
duplication and complexity that make it harder to assist the supposed 
beneficiaries.  
Abolishing the FFEL program, so that all Stafford and PLUS loans are 
made by the government under the auspices of the Direct loan program, 
was a step in the right direction. Just as it removed guaranty agencies and 
private lenders from the student loan system when it abolished the FFEL 
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program, Congress should also consider reforming the Perkins loan 
program to take institutions of higher education out of the federally 
guaranteed lending business. Going further, Congress should harmonize 
repayment provisions for all federally guaranteed loans. For example, a 
borrower should be able to choose one repayment plan for all of his loans, 
and obtain cancellation for all concurrently issued loans at the same time.  
In the end, legislative reform might create a single student loan with a 
fixed interest rate based on the government’s cost of borrowing and a single 
income-based repayment plan. The agency ought to divert delinquent 
borrowers into IBR and other income-dependent plans. In 2013, the DOE 
made a start by emailing borrowers about IBR. Also, a forgiven or 
discharged student loan should not be taxable income. Finally, dispensing 
with private debt collectors would also improve the student-loan program. 
Eliminating the confusion and complexity will eliminate many traps 
for the unwary. If Congress legislates better, the executive will execute 
better. But confusion and complexity are not the biggest problems. 
The senior author worked his way through college and law school. 
Thus one lower-income student and law student became a lawyer, indeed a 
professor. That “social contract” with state appropriations, need-based 
scholarships, and low tuition didn’t exist for the junior author. Educational 
expenses outstripped inflation. College costs are up, while the Great 
Recession pushed state support and family incomes down. 
The original goal of access to higher education has been eroded. 
Accomplishing the goal of access would require adding increased Pell 
Grants for low-income students to loan programs. Also, the high tuition in 
the United States compares unfavorably with low or no tuition in other 
countries.531  
Students’ future earning ability and loans replaced low tuition as 
financing education was projected into the future through loan repayment. 
The student borrowers who were not “creditworthy” would not have been 
able to borrow under normal credit conditions. Nor can a creditor take a 
security interest in a student borrower’s increased earning capacity. But, 
because of the creditor’s advantages in collection, a student loan is 
effectively secured by human capital.  
                                                                                                     
 531. Schrag, supra note 123, at 405. 
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A defaulting borrower, and there are tens of thousands of them, must 
deal with stress and a negative credit rating.532 And assembly-line collection 
companies will be likely to employ abusive collection tactics.533  
Over several centuries, legislatures and courts have worked out the law 
of debtor and creditor. In the race of collection, the judgment is the 
creditor’s starting line, except for prejudgment attachment. Qualifying most 
creditors’ rights are the debtor’s contract defenses, the debtor’s exemptions, 
the statute of limitations time bar, and the bankruptcy discharge. Many of 
these qualifications were eliminated or diminished for the student-loan 
debtor. Once she enters the collection labyrinth, the borrower’s exits are 
few and difficult to find. 
Of the student-loan creditor’s advantages, the most difficult provision 
to justify—and the most disruptive—is the restriction of her bankruptcy 
discharge. The student loan exception stands out in the bankruptcy code. 
Most exceptions to discharge target wrongful or punishment-worthy 
conduct534 or domestic relations obligations like child support and 
alimony.535 Other debtors of the federal government face far lower hurdles, 
if any, to discharge. Debtors may even receive a discharge for tax debts in 
many circumstances, provided that they have not engaged in tax evasion. 
As one consumer advocate put it, the discharge exception relegates student 
loan borrowers to “a special circle of bankruptcy hell reserved for dads who 
avoid child support and tax evaders.”536 
What should Congress do with the bankruptcy discharge? One option 
is to do nothing. Supporters of the status quo argue that discharge is 
unwarranted either because student borrowers are deadbeat debtors 
undeserving of discharge, or because the debts to the government should be 
more difficult to discharge than debts to other creditors. 
                                                                                                     
 532. Daniel Austin, The Indentured Generation: Bankruptcy and Student Loan Debt, 53 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 329, 407 (2013). 
 533. Id. at 407–08 (noting the types of abusive practices include “incessant phone calls 
to home and work numbers at all hours, bullying, misrepresentation, and threats”).  
 534. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2010) (fraudulently obtained debts), (a)(4) (theft), 
(a)(6) (intentional torts), (a)(8) (debts arising from federal fines, penalties, forfeiture), (a)(9) 
(personal injury caused by driving, flying, or boating while legally intoxicated), (a)(13) 
(criminal restitution). 
 535. Id. § 523(a)(5) (“domestic support obligations”), (a)(15) (alimony). 
 536. Tyler Kingkade, Private Student Loan Bankruptcy Rule Traps Graduates With 
Debt Amid Calls For Reform, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2012, 9:51 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/14/private-student-loans-bankruptcy-
law_n_1753462.html. 
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Although debtor-focused arguments animated Congress’s push to 
impose the heightened “undue discharge” standard for student loans,537 they 
are largely unpersuasive. Fears of student borrowers “filing for bankruptcy 
immediately upon graduation, thereby absolving themselves of the 
obligation to repay their student loans”538 are largely unfounded. There is 
no empirical evidence that a student loan borrower is likely to commit fraud 
by borrowing to finance an education and then filing bankruptcy the day 
after she graduates.539 Moreover, under general statutes that would remain 
in place, a fraudulently obtained debt cannot be discharged.540 A more 
nuanced argument posits that a student debtor had time to think about 
borrowing and surely considered repayment.541 But this is contrary to 
observation and social science.542  
Slightly more persuasive are the arguments that focus on the creditor 
rather than the borrower. As one court explained, excepting student loans 
from discharge “help[s] ensure the financial integrity of the student loan 
program,” and also “help[s] ensure ‘public support for the [student loan] 
program by preventing debtors from easily discharging their debts at the 
expense of the taxpayers who made possible their education.’”543 Unlike 
                                                                                                     
 537. Cazenovia College v. Renshaw, 222 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 538. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hornsby, 144 F.3d 433, 436–37 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 539. “[T]here are no compelling empirical data to buttress the myth that students 
defraud creditors any more than other debtors.” John A. E. Pottow, The Nondischargeability 
of Student Loans in Personal Bankruptcy Proceedings: The Search for a Theory, 44 CAN. 
BUS. L.J. 245, 266 (2007); Richard Fossey, “The Certainty of Hopelessness:” Are Courts 
Too Harsh Toward Bankrupt Student Loan Debtors?, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 29, 34 (1997) 
(arguing that Congressional fears of student abuse of bankruptcy laws were unjustified given 
that no empirical evidence existed showing students were acting in bad faith). Smith, supra 
note 448, at 337 (finding no evidence of abuse). 
 540. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2010) (prohibiting discharge of individual debt 
obtained by “false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud . . . .”). 
 541. Douglas G. Baird, Discharge, Waiver, and the Behavioral Undercurrents of 
Debtor-Creditor Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 17, 28 (2006) (“Unlike ordinary extensions of 
consumer credit . . . .  [t]he decision to take [an education] loan is part of a larger decision 
(leaving or not entering the workforce and moving) that is made only after considerable 
thought and care.”). 
 542. See Austin, supra note 508, at 357 (explaining that the “skyrocketing cost” of 
education and the unavailability of jobs in certain fields combine to undermine students’ 
expected future earnings); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 249–53 (2011) 
(coining the terms “planning fallacy” and “optimism bias” to explain “failures of 
forecasting” that can lead to dramatic differences between a plan and the eventual outcome). 
 543. In re Miller, 409 B.R. 299, 308 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (third alteration in original) 
(quoting In re Frushour, 433 F.3d 393, 400 (4th Cir. 2005)).  
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arguments directed at borrowers, these arguments have some basis in fact. 
Bankruptcy filers in 2007 alone held a total of around $5 billion in student 
loan debt,544 but almost none of that debt was successfully discharged in 
bankruptcy.  
Of course, to say that the government should not bear the $5 billion 
annual cost of student loan discharge is to say that bankrupt student 
borrowers should. For the most part, supporters of non-dischargability do 
not persuasively explain why student loan debt should be treated differently 
from other federally-held or backed debts. A dollar of government-held 
debt discharged in bankruptcy hurts the public fisc the same, whether the 
debt is from student loans, Small Business Administration loans, or unpaid 
taxes. If the bankruptcy law’s fresh-start policy is strong enough to justify 
excusing the income tax delinquent or failed SBA borrower from repaying 
their debts, is it not strong enough to warrant forgiving the defaulting 
student loan borrower as well? 
Many observers have suggested that the policy of fresh start should 
lead to broadening a student-loan borrower’s bankruptcy discharge.545 
Policymakers have joined this chorus. In the fall of 2013, Senator Elizabeth 
Warren, without specifying details, advocated that student borrowers should 
be able to discharge the loans in bankruptcy like home mortgages and 
medical debts.546 Senator Warren and her colleagues in Congress can 
choose from a smorgasbord of proposals.  
First, Professor Austin favors reduction of debt to “actual fair market 
value,” which he defines as “the amount that an investor would pay to 
purchase the respective student loan obligation.”547 Second, Congress can 
                                                                                                     
 544. See Iuliano, supra note 435, at 504, 510 (estimating, based on the 2007 Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project, that 238,446 individuals with student loan debt filed for bankruptcy in 
2007, and that these individuals held, on average, $20,538 in student loan debt).  
 545. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Mortgaging Human Capital: Federally Funded Subprime 
Higher Education, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439, 474 (2012) (advocating dischargeability of 
federal student loans, subject to a five or seven year waiting period). 
 546. Tyler Kingkade, Elizabeth Warren Calls for Big Changes to Student Loans, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 29, 2013, 4:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost    
.com/2013/09/29/elizabeth-warren-student-loans_n_4013321.html (quoting Senator Warren 
as saying, “I’d like us to go a long way toward letting people deal with student loans the 
same way they deal with home mortgages and medical debts.”); see also Elizabeth Warren, 
A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 483, 491 n.16 (1997) 
(claiming that the National Bankruptcy Review Commission’s 1997 recommendation to 
permit dischargeability of student loans “go[es] a long way toward restoring the scope of the 
bankruptcy discharge”). 
 547. Austin, supra note 532, at 417–18. 
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return to the law between 1976 and 1998 when student debts were 
dischargeable after five or seven years.548 This would adequately address 
concerns about the hypothetical student loan debtor who graduates on 
Tuesday and files for bankruptcy on Wednesday. Third, Congress put the 
discharge of private student loans under undue hardship in 2005 despite the 
fact that this is not needed to protect the taxpayer.549 Congress could make 
private loans dischargeable again.550 Senator Durbin has introduced 
legislation to implement that idea.551  
To these options, we would add two more. Our initial proposal is a 
minimalist one based on the idea that student loan debt will continue to be 
excruciatingly difficult to discharge. Under present law, a Chapter 13 
debtor may pay a priority debt552 in full before paying general unsecured 
debts.553 But, unlike many other non-dischargeable debts, a student loan is 
not a priority debt. Congress should give student loans priority status so that 
the debtor may pay them ahead of unsecured debts.554 Second, Congress 
might consider modifying the student loan exception to shift the burden of 
bringing an adversary proceeding to contest discharge from the debtor to 
the creditor. 
The simplest and we think the wisest option, however, is to treat a 
student loan like other unsecured debt, for example a credit-card debt. Our 
colleague Professor Margaret Howard analogizes educational debts to 
credit-card debts and argues that the debtor should be able to discharge the 
                                                                                                     
 548. Id. at 416; Braucher, supra note 545, at 473. 
 549. See Austin, supra note 532, at 364 (noting that the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act extended the student loan discharge exception to 
all education loans, including those with no federal guaranty). 
 550. See Austin, supra note 532, at 415 (suggesting that making private student loans 
dischargeable might “strike a useful middle ground, as there are no forgiveness programs for 
private loans, and lenders can refuse to make new loans” to borrowers deemed 
uncreditworthy). 
 551. Fairness for Struggling Students Act of 2013, S. 114, 113th Cong. (2013). In the 
House, Representative Steve Cohen has introduced a similar bill.  Private Student Loan 
Bankruptcy Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 532, 113th Cong. (2013). Smith, supra note 448, at 
349 (2013) (agreeing that debtors should be allowed to discharge private student loans). 
 552. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2010) (listing claims that have priority and not including 
student loans). 
 553. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2), (4) (2010) (mandating full payment of claims entitled 
to priority, except in limited circumstances).  
 554. Braucher, supra note 545, at 473–75. See also Smith, supra note 448, at 352 
(2013) (calling for treatment of student debt as a priority debt in Chapter 13, like back 
taxes). 
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debts in the same way. She writes that Congress based the “undue 
hardship” bar on discharge on anecdote and overgeneralization.555 If fortune 
favors, we favor Professor Howard’s solution. 
The divided hyper-partisan Congress that gave us the confusing and 
unfair student-loan system we have isn’t, Professor Austin insists, about to 
ameliorate the student debtor’s plight.556 Politics is the art of the possible, 
but politics isn’t our job. Our role as scholars is not to anticipate Congress’s 
response, but it is to address the issues as we see them, and to discover and 
then explain what justice requires. We hope that someday the wise and 
humane solutions we propose will become public policy. 
                                                                                                     
 555. Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1047, 1087 (1987) (“[T]he [educational loan] provision is a perfect example of 
legislation based on pathological cases, in which a result appropriate for a small minority of 
cases is imposed on substantially all.”); Smith, supra note 448, at 337 (2013)(also finding no 
evidence of abuse). See also Sarah E. Smith, Should the Eighth Circuit Continue To Be the 
Loan Ranger? A Look at the Totality of the Circumstances Test for Discharging Student 
Loans Under the Undue Hardship Exception in Bankruptcy, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 601, 615–
19 (2006) (examining four tests for “undue hardship” developed by federal courts). 
 556. Austin, supra note 532, at 417 (“Discharge of education loan debt is not likely in 
the foreseeable future, and as yet, the marketplace has not come up with a solution to student 
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